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he gain control of the company in the ncar future. To the extent that funds andlor 
property is recovered that exceed the arnotmts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such 
funds andlor property with the Court for the distribution to innocent shareholders of AlA 
Services. 
24. Clements Brown has never been authorized to represent AlA Insurance or 
AfA Services in Taylor v. A fA Services. el al. Clements Brown has not represented the 
interests of AlA Insurance or ALA Services, but instead has represented the interests of 
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Deck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan 
Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties. 
25. As the only authorized officer and board member of AlA Insunmce, Reed 
Taylor, has not and will not authorize or consent to Clements Brown as being attorneys 
for A[A· rnsurance or representing the company in any fashion or consent to the 
representation of Jolm Taylor. As a person who is required to be a member of the board 
of AlA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize Clements Brown to 
represent A IA Services nor has he or will he authorize or consent to Clements Drown's 
representation of John Taylor. Thus, Clements Brown had no scope of representation 
when it purportedly represented AIA Insurance and AlA Services because it is unlawfully 
representing AlA Services and ArA Insurance. 
26. Reed Taylor is the pledgee of alJ of the shares of A (A Insurance, the only 
shareholder of AlA Insurance by way of holding aU of its shares as collat~ral, the only 
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of 
AlA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AlA Services is insolvent). 
ALA Services and AlA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay Ihe over 
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$8,500,000, plus interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed Taylor. Therefore, 
Reed Taylor is entitled (0 bring certain claims directly against Clements Brown for 
certain damages. 
27. At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AlA 
Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Reed Taylor is presently 
owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services. At all material times, Clements Bro\'r71 had full 
knowledge of ALA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor. 
28. AIA Services defaulted on the terms of the $6,000,000 promissory note 
when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a 
fonnal demand was unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on 
August J, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AlA Services by Reed 
Taylor on December 12,2006. AlA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to 
be insolvent from said date. 
29. Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AlA Services, 
Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AlA 
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Insurance and AlA 
Services. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement datcd July 1, 
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of AlA Services to vote the 
stock of AfA Insurance, and take operational control of AlA lnsurance. Reed Taylor's 
right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AlA Services' 
irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor tbat was couplcd with an interest as 
rcquin:d by I.e § 30-1-722. 
III 
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30. On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance and 
attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided under the 
law, the contract documents, and I.e. § 30-1-722. However, the interested purported 
directors and officers of AlA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Clements 
Brown intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Redemption Agreements and 
refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AlA lnsurance and 
refused to surrender control as required. 
31. Clements Brown further cngaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting 
interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining andlor maintaining a restraining 
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Clements Brown knew there 
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and 
tortious jnterference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and funds 
of AlA Insumnce were being misappropriated andlor not safeguarded (Le., restraining 
and/or enjoining Reed Taylor would permit assets and funds to continue to be 
misappropriated). 
32. Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AlA Services, AlA 
Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, 
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and oUlcr claims under NC:l 
Pcrce County Case No. CV-07-00208 ("Taylor v. AlA Services, el al. "), and lherdn Reed 
Taylor obtained an order of panial summary judgment for AlA Services' default of t11C 
$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this panial summary judgment andlor his prior vote 
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AlA Insurance but for 
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the actions of John Taylor. which Clements Brown, with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's 
rights. fadlitated and aided and abctled to the dClriment of AlA Services. AlA insurance 
and Reed Taylor. 
33. With Clements Brown's full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims asserted in 
Taylor v. AL4 Services, el af. included claims for breaches of fiduciary dUly, conspiracy, 
fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including 
CropUSA). including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongfully 
transferred over SI,5oo,000 of AlA Insurance's cash to CropUSA. for no consideration 
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AlA Insurance to CropUSA 
for no considenttion. John Taylor was at aU times material also an interested director, 
officer and shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims 
thal John Taylor and others had engaged in sdf-dealing andlor fraudulent transactions 
with AlA SClVices and/or AlA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed 
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including 
CropUSA). 
34. [n 2007, Clements Brown appeared in the civil action. Taylor v. AlA 
Services. cl al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AfA Services, a 
corporation, and AlA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of John 
Taylor, an individual, and the interests of other interested patties (including Connie 
Taylor, James neck and Michael Cashman), lhereby exceeding any possible scope of 
purported representation. At all matcrial timcs John Taylor was an interested purported 
CEO and director of AlA SelVices and AlA Insurance and an interested majority 
shareholdc:r of AlA SeTvices. The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil 
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conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated by John Taylor and 
others against AlA Services and AlA Insurance. and such acts having damaged and 
continuing to cause damages to the corporations. their shareholders and creditors. In 
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Clements 
Brown undertook to represent the three named clients AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and 
CropUSA. which such entities had no true common interests and each having 
irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other. 
35. In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Clements Brown that it was 
not appropriate for Clements Brown to represent John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance, and/or to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of 
interest and the fact that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims 
against him. Despite the warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's altorney, 
Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to 
AlA Services and AlA Insurdl1ce, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and its duty of care. 
36. On March 28, 2007, Clements Brown finally recognized the violations of 
ethics and conflicts of interest and withdrew from representing AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance. Although Clements Brown should have withdrawn from representing John 
Taylor, AlA Services and AlA [nsurancc in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporatioll. et aI., 
Clements Brown committed a further violation of the (daho Rub of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care by terminating the representation of the corporalions and 
continuing to represent John Taylor. which was a breach of their dUlY of loyalty to the 
corporations. Clements Brown's actions constitute a violation of the "hot pot..<tto·· 
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doctrine because it never received propcr, authorized and informed written consent from 
the corporations and it kn~w that the corporations should be pursuing claims against John 
Taylor and others. 
37. Clements Brown inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint 
Defense Agrccmcnt(s) knowing that ALA Services, ALA (nsurance, CropUSA Insurance, 
Inc., John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in Tay/or P. AlA Services. et 
al. had dear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AlA Services, AlA Insurance 
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AlA Services, e/ at., a Joint Defense Agreement was not 
permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, cOllversion and the 
commission of other torts such as breaches of fiduciary duties through conspiracy and 
aiding and abetting, along with other causes of actions. The Joint Defense Agreements 
were entered into without obtaining informed consent from disinterested and authorized 
representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agrccm(!nts were also 
independently not appropriate or pennitted when certain partks to the Joint Defense 
Agreements should be asserting claims against other parties to such agreements. 
38. 'Inc Joint Defense Agrecmcnt(s) facilitated and/or substantially assisted by 
Clements Brown has substantially assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck, 
Connie Taylor, Michael Caslunan and CropUSA) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, 
traudulent conveyances. conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, while 
also asshYting Clement" Brown in inappropriately and unlawfully ubtaining payment of 
fees and cost'! for its services and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
law, and Clements Brown's duty of care. 
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39. Clements Brown assisted AlA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA. John 
Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions 
which were in violation of the Rllles of Professional Conduct, the law and its duty of 
care, were not in the best interests of the corporations. not authorized by disinteresled 
parties, constituted fraud andlor the inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging 
to AlA Services andlor ALA Insurance, were not anus-length transactions, andlor were 
done so without requiring AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance to retain separate 
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested and 
authorized parties. 
40. As the former purported attorneys for AlA Services, an entity, Clements 
Brown owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of 
care, and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the 
assets and businesses of the corporation, and sinee ArA Services was insolvent, to its 
creditors including Reed Taylor. As fonner purported attorneys for AlA Services, and in 
light of the claims made against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Clements Brown 
owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of Jolm 
Taylor. individually andlor through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other 
interested parties. 
41. As the former purported attorneys for AlA Insurance, an entity. Clements 
Brown owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. its duty of 
care and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of 
the corpora.tion's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and 
assume control and who had exercised his contracluaJ rights and had voted the shares but 
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whose rights were breached and rejected by interested unauthorized directors, officers 
and olhers who were in control of the corporation including John Taylor. As past 
purported attorneys for AlA Insurance and in light of the claims made against John 
Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Clements Brown owed a duty to its entity client 
not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually andlor through 
any Joint Defense Agreement, andlor of other interested parties (including CropUSA, 
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Caslunan). 
42. As attorneys representing John Taylor (including through a Joint Defense 
Agreement), Clements Brown owed its duties first and foremost to its former purported 
clients AlA Services and AlA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, duly of care andlor the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking 
directions andlor accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and 
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by 
the Reed Taylor, Clements Brown owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to 
assume representation of tbe intcrests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested 
parties directly or indirectly through any Joint Dcfense Agreemcnts. Clements Brown 
failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate 
and authorized parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct .. Clements Brown's duty of care, and the Rylaws and Articles of 
Fonnation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor. 
43. As the fonner purported attorneys for AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance 
(individually or through any Joint Defcnse Agreement) Clements Brown owed duties of 
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Service!)', 
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et al., or represent or assist John Taylor in Donna J. Taylor v. R. John Taylor because 
Clements Brown's loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. 
Furthennore, Clements Brown could in no way participate in any joint defense of 
CropUSA or other interested parties (such as John Taylor. Connie Taylor, James Beck, 
and/or Michael Cashman) as ArA Services and/or AlA Insurance should have been 
asserting claims against CropUSA, each other. and other interested and uninkrested 
parties. 
44. Clements Brown represented, and continue to represent, the interests of 
John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full 
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and purported director of AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the 
course of litigation involving Clements Brown's former clients, AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. 
45. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, Clements 
Brown has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady"), 
the law firm that has represented AlA Services and AlA Services beforl! and throughout 
litigation with Clements Brown in Taylor v. AlA Services, et 01. During the course of the 
civil action aller March 28, 2007, John Taylor and olhers have further engaged in 
inappropriate and/or wrongful lransactions involving themsc\ves, AlA Services, AfA 
Insurance, and CropUSA, which Lidnsactions have occurred with Clements Brown's 
knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of AlA Services, AlA rnsurance, and 
Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee. 
46. Clements Brown is liable to Reed Taylor for an umount to be proven at 
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trial because Clements Brown has encouraged, conspired with, provided substantial 
assistance to, and/or aided and abetted John Tayior, Connie Taylor, James Heck, Michael 
Cashman, Bryan Freeman, JoLec Duclos, AlA Services, AlA fnsurance, CropUSA, 
andlor other interested parties in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties. and other unlawful acts. 
The acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference. conversion, and breaches 
of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AlA 
Insurance and AlA Services, Clements Brown assisted and/or aided and abetted John 
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Reed Taylor's contractual rights 
to control and operate AlA Insurance, which has proximately caused damages to Reed 
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AlA Services and AlA Insurance, Clements 
Brown inappropriately assisted andlor aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested 
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AlA Services, AlA 
Insurance. and/or CropUSA, which such trdOsactions have been to the detriment of AlA 
Services, AfA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed 
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually 
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Clements Brown has had full knowledge that its 
client is an interested party and purported director of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and 
Crop USA, and is personally conducting andcolltrolling the course of litigation involving 
Clements Brown's former clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, and Clements 
Brown has assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including. 
CroplJSA) and has coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles & 
Brady in John Taylor's engaging in t011ious transactions involving himself: AlA 
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Services, AlA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions hav\! been to the detriment of 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a 
creditor and stock pledgee. 
47. In connection with Clements Brown's inappropriate representation and/or 
joint defense of Jolm Taylor, AlA Services, A[A. Insurance, CropUSA, and other 
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman) 
Clements Brown accepted payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed 
$100,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as 
participating andlor assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting 
of others in the commission of torts, including breaches of fiduciary duties and 
conversion. 
48: Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AlA Services. et a/., 
Reed Taylor's attorney in that action advised Clements Brown on numerous occasions 
that its con~uct violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was 
inappropriatc, and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested 
parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against 
them. In early 2007, Clements Brown was advised that its inappropriate actions would 
result in claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's counsel 
reiterated these wamings orally and in writing on numcrotL" occasions. Despite the 
warnings from Reed Taylor's counsel, Clements Brown conduct persisted thereby further 
damaging Reed Taylor. Clements Brown's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings call only 
be construed as intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties 
to the dcu'iment of Reed Taylor. 
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49. Clements Brown wrongfully assisted John Taylor and other interested 
parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other 
things of value inappropriately obtained from AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, and 
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA and Michael 
Cashman) in preventing claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them. 
Clements Brown wrongfully assisted andior failed to prevent interested parties (including 
Jolm Taylor) in transferring the long-tenn employees of AlA Insurance to CropUSA, 
while at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al., that the 
corporations were being operated properly andior failing to advise the Court of the 
inappropriate acts, misappropriation of assets, and inappropriate and/or Imlawful 
transactions. All the while Clements Brown was aware of andlor assisted in the 
inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20.000 
per year when A[A Services was insolvent. 
50. Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Clements Brown take action to 
pro(~ct the assets nlld funds of ALA Services and AlA Insurance and recover funds and 
assets from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the 
benefit of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Clements Brown refused to act in 
accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite 
Reed Taylor's demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be 
considered andlor protected bccaullt! of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other 
interested parties, Clements Brown refused 10 act and failed to fully and properly disclose 
all pertinent facts to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes. 
III 
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51. In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the eourt in 
Taylor v. AlA Service.~. et a!., Clements Brown made arguments that did not benefit AlA 
Servit:es, AlA Insur.mce, or Reed Taylor. inappropriately made other arguments 
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie 
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take 
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, Crop USA, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of 
Michael Cashman, Clements Brown successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AlA 
Services, et al., that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Clements 
Brown knew that such actions were directly impacting the assets and funds of its fonner 
purpolted clients, AlA Insurance and AlA Services. 
52: . Despite Reed Taylor's demands lhat disinterested directors andlor parties 
must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations. Clements Brown refused and 
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation 
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands 
that action be taken to tenninate AlA Insuranee'5 impf-opcr guarantee of a $15,000,000 
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Clements Brown refused to act, failed Lo inform or fully 
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan 
guarantees or rcport the unlawful actions to the Court. 
53. Clements Brown's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Prot~ssional 
Conduct, the law and its duty 01 care. which require Clements Brown to disgorge all 
attorneys' fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AlA Services, el al., and tor any other 
related andior unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2 I 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 7J'()/ 
the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Clements Brown refused to do so. 
54. Through the acts of Clements Brown, the value of AlA Insurance and the 
assets of AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations' 
value and assets have been impaired, andlor the assets and funds have been trmsferrcd to 
CropUSA. Through the acts of Clemenls Brown, ownership of CropUSA was vested and 
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major 
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed 
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent 
minority shareholders and creditors, Clements Brown has refused to take acLion and 
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck and Michael Cashman). 
55: Despite Clements Brown having made several legal arguments that lacked 
merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facls, Clements Brown participated 
in providing a settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services, ef al., which 
included a provision that he release all claims against Clements Brown as a condition of 
the settlemellt. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Clements Brown's duty of care and its obligations to its fonner 
purported clients, AlA Services and AlA InslIrdnce. 
56. Clements Brown has assisted in the Inappropriatc acts of John Taylor and 
other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor nnd Donna Taylor, Reed 
Taylor's tonncr wile and the holder of all outstanding Preterred A Shares of AlA 
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of 
directors of AlA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Clement') Brown has assisted John Taylor 
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and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being 
members of the board of directors of AlA Services, which has further far reaching 
ramifications regarding the validity of any corporate act and results in additional damages 
against Clements Brown. 
57. With full knowledge of AlA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed 
Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AlA Services' board until they were paid in 
full, Clements Brown proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings 
and take and/or recommend inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by 
interested purported directors without Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor being present and 
without providing them with their right to be present, which further results in all such 
meetings and decisions being null and void, and Clements Brown being liable for the 
associated-damages for substantially participating in such actions. 
58. Clements Brown assisted and/or failed to prevent andlor notify 
disinterested parties or the Court that AlA Services had inappropriately pledged its sole 
remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 Mortgage (in which Reed Taylor held a 
sccurity interest), to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of over $100,000 [or Clements 
Brown's services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and 
the law. 
59. Clements Brown omitted and/or misrepresented matcrial [acts to the Court 
in Taylor v. AfA Services. et (J/., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. [n several instances, 
Clements Brown persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of 
Ihe corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the Clements Brown's purported 
clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, and Reed Taylor (including requesting Iiltle or 
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no bond and consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when Clements Brown 
knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded). 
60. Clements Brown has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other 
interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided 
and bome by ALA Insurance andlor AlA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John 
Taylor and other interested parties. 
61. Clements Brown had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's 
Agreement. Even though John Taylor has breached the terms of his employment contract 
with AlA Services by competing against AlA Services through CropUSA (and violating 
the corporate opportunity doctrine). by soliciting employees of AlA Insurance, and other 
inappropriate actions, Clements Brown has intentionally refused to act in the best 
interests of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, their shareholders, andlor Reed Taylor, to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor. 
62. Clements Brown assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining 
funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AlA Services' creditor Reed Taylor 
(including, without Iimitalion, over $95,000 owed by llacific Empire Radio Corporation 
to AlA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation to John Taylor, and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John 
Taylor) by not reporting such acls to disinterested parties or other appropriate and 
authorized parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and it-q duty of care. 
63. In April 2007, Clements Brown pcnuitted andlor assisted interested pa11ies 
in holding a joint board meeting of AlA Services and A IA Insurance with full knowledge 
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on 
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the board of AlA Services and participating in such meetings (DOlUla Taylor has 
subordinated ber right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting hdd, in April 
2007. Clements Brown permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor 
and James Beck to the purportcU boards of A[A Services and AlA Insurance knowing 
that they were interested parties who AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance should be 
pursuing claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA, that they were 
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent 
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of 
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. 
64. Clements Brown inappropriately permitted andfor assisted two interested 
parties, Conrne Taylor and James Beck, to approve andlor consent to a Joint Defense 
Agreement with Clements Brown and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate 
joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests 
and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules 
of Prof(!~siona] Conduct and its duty of care, to the detriment of AlA Services, i\IA 
Insurance and Reed Taylor. 
65. At all relevant times, Clements Brown has been fully aware of Reed 
Taylor's rights to property in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as 
collateral. 
66. Clements Brown also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of 
AlA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the signif1cant claims 
against ule interested parties (including Juhn Tllylor and CropUSA) and the significant 
misappropriation of the corporations' asselc;, but provided legal services on behalf of the 
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interested parties and unlawfully accepted payment from AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance. [n connection with the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to other named 
parties in Taylor v. AlA Services, el aI., Clements Brown failed to obtain the necessary 
approvals from Reed Taylor or other disinterested and/or authorized parties to the 
detriment of AlA Services. AlA [nsurance and/or Reed Taylor. 
67. Despite demands to the contmry. Clements Brown continued to take 
instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or John Taylor) of AlA 
Services and/or AlA hlSurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are 
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that 
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty 
of care, and/or thc law. 
II. CLEMENTS BROWN'S AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONSPIRACY 
68. Clements Brown is committing and ha<; committed tortious acts in concert 
with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, 
.IoLec Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others) 
and/or pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parti!:!s. 
69. Clements Brown knew that the conduct of other parties (including John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Jor ,ec Duclos, Crop USA, Bryan 
Freeman. Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties 
and/or gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to such other parties in 
breaching said duties. Clements Brown knew that it was purportedly using the l10nllally 
lawful act of practicing law to commit and/or substantially assist olhers in committing 
unlawful acts. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 26 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR mmCIAL NOTICE 
70. Clements Brown gave substantial assistance to other parties (including 
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, 
Bryan Freeman, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing and/or 
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acts (including, without limitation, breaches of 
fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious 
interference, and other claims), and Clements Drown's conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AlA Services. AlA Insurance, and/or Reed 
Taylor. 
71. Clements Brown conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in 
the commission of the torts andlor caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including 
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos. CropUSA, 
Bryan Freeman, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the 
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AlA Services, AlA 
Insurance, and Reed Taylor. 
72. Clements Brown's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy 
in the commission of the lorts and/or causes of action alleged in this Complaint, 
including, without limitation, the conspiracy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as 
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements. 
73. The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each 
cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting and/or civiil:onspiracy 
of the torts and/or causes of action set forth below and/or contemplated in this Complaint. 
III 
III 
fIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT· 27 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 78tJ7 
/ 
HI. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
74. Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and 
perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of ALA Services 
and ALA Insurance and aU proceeds relating to such security interests. Rel!d Taylor also 
has a security interest in all of the stock of ArA Insurance and the stock of all of A[A 
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and all distributions and proceeds 
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage). 
Clements Brown had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing 
property and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption 
Agreements. 
75. By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AlA Insurance's 
commissions, his security interest in AlA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual 
right to the possession and control of AlA (nsurance on February 22, 2007, atl of ALA 
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of 
Reed Taylor. including, without limitation, the $1.2 MiJIion Mortgage, settlement 
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or 
utilized in any way by CropUSA. and every dollar of revenue generated by AlA 
rnsurance from all sources sinee February 22, 2007. 
76. Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he 
has a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all 
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the 
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in 
the stock of all of AlA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related 
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thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption 
Agreements. 
77. All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced 
lhrough various sources to identity all funds and assets that Clements Brown has 
unlawfully taken or assisted others in taking. CIl!ments Bro\\.'11 has taken control of 
property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without 
I imitation, all funds received for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs in Taylor v. AlA 
Services, et al. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Clements 
Brown has exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage) and/or funds (any funds received from AlA Services or A[A Insurance) in 
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's 
possessory rights and security interests. 
78. Clements Brown has received substantial payments believed to exceed 
$100,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Clements Brown 
had no lawful right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right (0 
possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional 
Conduct Clements Brown's duty of care. Clements Brown also accepted payment of 
funds purportedly owed to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage (to the 
extent that any funds were derived from the Mortgage) Reed Taylor was legally entitled 
to possess. Clements Brown has also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' Ices 
and costs rendered for John Taylor, which w~re paid by the money and/or assets 
unlawfully derived from AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, which such money andlor 
assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests and/or were derived from proceeds from 
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such security interests. 
79. Clements Brown's conduct constitutes the willful interference with 
property and/or funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance; 
and/or which such property and/or funds should be under the possession andlor control of 
AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money 
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Clements Brown intentionally deprived Reed 
Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds. 
Despite demands, Clements Brown has refused to return such propertyand/or funds, and 
has unlawfully retained the property and/or funds. 
80. As a direct andlor proximate cause of Clements Brown's acts and/or 
omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
8!. Clements Brown has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with other 
parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess andlor 
property to which AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance are entitled to possess (including, 
without limitation, funds paid to Clements Brown, funds paid to John Taylor and other 
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5 
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA). As a direct andlor proximate result of 
Clements Brown's aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy relating to the conversion 
of assets andlor funds that Reed Taylor. AlA Services, andlor AlA Insurance are legally 
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AlA Insurance, and/or AlA Services have been 
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
III 
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IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor AlA lnsurancc's Causes of Actions) 
82. Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Clements Brown 
had full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements. Clements Brown intentionally 
interfered with R.eed Taylor's contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements 
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements. Clements Brown's intentional 
interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's 
contractual rights to vote the shares of AlA Insurance, rights to possession of the 
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AlA Services, right to be an 
officer and director of AlA Insurance, right to possession and control of AlA Insurance, 
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the 
Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action arc 
tortious interference claims based upon Clements Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance. 
83. Clements Brown has also aidcd and abetted andlor conspired with John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, loLee Duclos. Bryan Freeman, 
Crop USA andlor other parties in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's contractual 
rights. Clements Brown's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting 
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's 
contractual rights. 
84. As a direct andlor proximate result of Clements Brown's acts and/or 
omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be 
determined allhe time of trial or on sununary judgment. 
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85. AlA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement. 
Clements Brown has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement. Clements 
Brown has intentionally interfered with AlA Services' contractual rights set forth in the 
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive OLlicer's Agreement. 
Clements Brown's intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously 
interfering with AlA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring 
AlA Insurance's employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing 
against AlA Services or AlA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John 
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed 
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AlA Services, ef af. Also included in this cause 
of action are tortious interference claims based upon Clements Brown, John Taylor, 
Connie T-aylor. James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of 
AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. 
86. Clements Brown has 'also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AfA Services' contractual 
rights. Clements Brown's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting 
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AlA Services' 
contractual rights. 
87. As a direct and/or proximate result of Clements I3rown's acts and/of 
omissions. AlA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to 
be detennined at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
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88. Clements Brown owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor 
AlA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint. 
89. Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor 
of AlA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, a 
stock plcdgee in which Clements Brown knew had lawfully voted the shares of AlA 
Insurance, the only authorized officer and director of AlA Insurance, the holder of a 
security interest in aU of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance, the holder of 8: security interest in all of the shares of all of AlA Services' 
other subsidiaries and aU distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage and $800,000 settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AlA 
Services, and the only party entitled to the remaining assets of AlA St:rvices and AlA 
[nsurdllce. 
90. Clements Brown owed and owes duties to AlA Services and AlA 
r nsurance to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow 
interested parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taking actions that are 
not in the best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized 
andlor conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of 
assets and funds to interc!sted parties to the delriment of ALA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance, to advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John 
Taylor and other interested panies, and to not issue opinion Ictters to auditor!' andlor 
other parties to assist in the commission of tortious conduct. Clements Brown has 
breached its duties and acted unlawfully (and aU improper andlor unlawful acts set forth 
andlor contemplated in this Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud tor 
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which AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount 
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
91. Clements Brown has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck. Michael Caslullan, IoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA andlor olher parties in the commission of fraud and/or constructive fraud and 
to otherwise defraud Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA fnsurance. As a direct 
and/or proximate result of Clements Brown's acts, Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor 
AIA Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on 
summary judgment. 
VI. FQURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-MALPRACTICE 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
92. Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship 
for all of the reasons sct forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the 
aIlegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From 
time to time, Clements Brown has also possessed funds andlor property which it should 
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing 
results in the existence of duties on the part of Clements Brown owed to Reed Taylor~ or 
at the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of 
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AlA Insurance pursuant 
10 his contrdctual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during 
Clements Brown's purported representation of AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance). 
Also included in these special duties is to not obtain a restraining order or injunction 
knowing that the funds, assets aud services of AlA Insurance were being misappropriated 
and/or unlawfully transferred. 
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93. Clements Brown's past purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries 
perfonning similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Clements Brown knew that 
its appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AlA Services 
and/or ALA Insurance to take action to prevent and/or rectify the breaches of tiduciary 
duties owed by AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches 
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Clements Brown assisted and/or are assisting in the 
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Clements Brown's 
actions and Clements Brown's obligations to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance would 
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect 
sums owed by others and recover damages tor the improper tortious conduct of others 
(including, without limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael 
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan freeman, and CropUSA). 
94. Clements Brown breached its duties (including, without limitation, the 
duty of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate 
result of Clements Brown's failure to pcrfonn the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was 
damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment 
95. Clements Brown owed AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance an attorney:-
client relationship for purportedly representing AlA Service and/or AlA Insurance and 
duties pertaining to the corporations being former clients, which results in the existence 
of duties on the part of Clements Brown owed to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. 
96. Clements Brown owed AlA Services, AlA Insurance Md/or Reed Taylor a 
duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical, 
unconflictcd, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with 
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the standard of care in lhc legal profession and as owed to the corpomtions (referred to 
herein and above as "duty of care"). Clements Brown breached its duty of care as a result 
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corpomtions and Reed Taylor. to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor. 
97. Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties owed to AlA Services, AlA 
Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including. without limitation. the duties of care and 
loyalty. 
98. Clements Brown's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of 
Clements Brown's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and 
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
99. Clements Brown breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to 
AfA Services andlor AlA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Clements 
Brown's failure to perform the duties owed to AfA Services and/or AlA Insurance in 
connection v,ith the legal services purportedly provided by Clements Brown, AlA 
Services andlor AlA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be pro yen at trial or on 
summary judgment. 
VII. FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OFTHE r.C.P.A. 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
100. Reed Taylor. AlA Services and AlA Insurance are all persons as defined 
by I.e. § 48-602. Clements Brown's purported practice of law constitutes services as 
defined by I.C. § 48-601. Reed Taylor, AlA Services and AlA rnsurance have either 
purchased services directly from Clements Brown, are known beneficiaries of services 
provided by Clements Brown, andlor its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar 
through which AlA Services, AlA rnsurance andlor Reed Taylor has contracted tor 
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services through trade and commerce. 
101. By way of the attorneys ofCleinents Brovvn's obligations to the Court and 
as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients, 
beneficiaries of their services, and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the laws. Clements Brown has served only the 
interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, loLee Duclos, 
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Clements Brown has not honestly 
represented to the Court and Clements Brown's beneficiary and/or adversary that 
Clements Brown was not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or the law, to the detriment of Reed Taylor. AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. 
Clements Brown's unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers 
and the integrity of the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices 
and violations of I.C. § 48-60 I, et seq. 
102. Clements Brown has falsely represented that it had approval from the 
Idaho State Oar and approval from authorized constituents Lo represent AfA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C. § 
48-603(5). Clements Brown has falsely represented that its services have been provided 
to a particular standard when in fact its services have not met the appropriate standards 
(including the standard of care) in violation or I.C. § 48-603(7), Clements Brown has 
HlIscly disparaged the services of Reed Taylor"s counsel in violation of I.e. § 48-603(8). 
Clements Brown has falsely represented that services were not nceded (i.e .• not making 
claims against lohn Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Crop USA 
and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in violation of LC. § 48-603(16). 
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Clements Brown has engaged in acts and/or practices that have been misleading to Reed 
Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance in violation of I.e. § 48·603(17). Based upon 
all of the allegations in this Complaint, Ckments Brown has also violated other 
applicable provisions orLC. § 48-603 and/or I.C. § 48·601, et seq. 
103. Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money 
and has been damaged by the methods. practices and/or acts of Clements Brown declared 
unlawful by I.C. § 48-601. el seq. 
104. AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance has purchased services and have lost 
property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of 
Clements Brown declared unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, el seq. AlA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance is requesting that all contracts for purported services provided by Clements 
Brown be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contmcts be 
returned to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. 
105. Clements Bro ... vn knew or should have known that its conduct was 
perpetrated directly and/or imlin.:ctly against Reed Taylor in violation of I.e. § 48-608, 
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has losl more than 25% of 
his monthly income by way of Clements Brown's unlawful acts. 
106. Clements Brown's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, specifically, I.e. § 48-601, el seq. Reed Taylor. 1\11\ Services and/or 
AlA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages. punitive damages, allomey's tees 
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a resull ot' Clcmcnrs Brown's violations 
and as available under I.e. § 48-601, ct .rcq. Clements Brown's violations or the 
unlawful acts of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the 
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exceptions to I.e. § 48-601, et seq. as set forth in I.e. § 48-605. 
VIII. SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Action) 
107. Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor 
of AlA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of ATA Insurance, a 
stock pledgee in which Clements Brown knew had lawfully voted the shares of AlA 
Insurance, the only authorized officer and director of ArA lnsurance, the holder of a 
security interest in all of the commissions and related receivables of ALA Services and 
AlA Insurance, the holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AlA Servicc~' 
other subsidiaries and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage and $800,000 settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AlA 
Services, and the only party entitled to the remaining assets of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance. Based upon aU of the foregoing and Clements Brown's possession of funds 
and assets of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance from time to time, Clements Brown 
owed a special fiduciary duty to safeguard the assets and funds of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance. 
108. Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a 
direct and/or proximate result of Clements Brown' s breached fiduciary duties, Reed 
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary 
judgment. 
109. Clements Brown, John Taylor, COIDlie Taylor, James Beck, loLee Duclos 
and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe tiduciary duties to AlA Services and/or AlA 
[nsurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent 
AlA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance (and the 
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person who voted the shares). Clements Brown has substantially assisted other parties in 
breaching the Bylaws of AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance. John Taylor owed andlor 
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by .... ray of being Reed Taylor's brother. The 
fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty, 
duty of care and duty to deal in good taith. 
110. Clements Brown had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to 
Reed Taylor. AfA Services and/or AlA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed 
Taylor, AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the 
obligation to safeguard AlA Services and AlA Insurance's assets and business 
relationships and to recover funds and assets unlawfully transferred from AlA Services or 
AlA Insurance. 
11 L Clements Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, 10Lee Duclos 
and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance; and Clements Brown knew that the foregoing parties' conduct 
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor AlA 
Insurance. These breached fiduciary duties are ongoing and Clements Brown has 
substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of 
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor AIA 
Insurance. Clements Brown also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the 
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance. 
112. Clements Brown's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AlA 
Services and/or AlA [nsurance in an amoUJ~t to be' proven at trial or on summary 
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judgment by aiding and abetting andlor sub~1.antially assisting others (including John 
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in: the commission of breaches of 
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, ALA Services andior ALA Insurance. 
IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACfION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATIONIWASTE 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
1 t3. Clements Brown has known that AlA Services is insolvent and ALA 
Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateraL Clements Brown has known that AlA 
Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent AlA Services. Clements Brown 
has known that AlA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its 
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years. 
114. Clements Brown has aided and abetted andlor conspired with John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and 
fees for purportedly being officers andlor directors of AlA Services and ALA Insurance. 
Clements Brown has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, Connie 
Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to waste the remaining assets of AlA 
Services and/or AlA Insurance. All the while Clements Brown has known of Reed 
Taylor'S rights ami AlA Services' insolvency. Clements Brown had full knowledge that 
John Taylor and other dircctors and otlicers' compensation was required to be set by the 
lawful board of directors of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, but substantially 
assisted John Taylor and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation. 
115. Clements Brown'~ acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AlA 
Services andlor AlA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary 
judgment by aiding and abetting andlor substantially assisting others (including, without 
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the 
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payment of excessive compensation. 
X. DEMAND FOR JURV TRIAL 
l. Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all 
claims and damages so triable. 
XI. PRA VER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Rced Taylor prays f'Or the following rei icf: 
L For a judgment against Clements Bro~ jointly and severally, for 
$6,000,000 in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble 
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary 
judgment, plus an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 
2. For a judgmcnt against Clements Brown, jointly and severally, for treble 
damages of $4,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.e. § 48-
608(2); 
3. For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all 
attorneys' fees and costs paid to Clements Brown by AlA Services andlor ALA Insurance; 
4. For judgment against Clements Brown, jointly and severally, for 
additional damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608~ 
5. For such other relicf as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C. § 
48-60 I, at seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary 
injullction to restrain Clements Brown from undertaking further representation; 
6. For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 
[daho Law. including. without limitation. I.C. § 48...(508, LC. § 12-120 andlor I.e. § 12-
121; and 
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7. For such other reI ief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this __ day of October, 2008. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
By: ___ . _________ _ 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 5S. 
COl;'NTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath. deposes and says: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. r have read the contents of this First 
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint. and believe 
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief 
Reed J. Taylor 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of October, 2008. 
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Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: _______ _ 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___ day of October, 2008, I caused to be 
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Boise,IO 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Appellant, 
v. 
MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS. BROWN & MCNICHOLS, 
P A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE 
DOES I-V, unknown individuals; 
Res ndents. 
Case No.: CV-08-01763 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MICHAEL E. 
MCNICHOLS AND CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS AND 
THE PARTIES' ATTORNEY JOHN J. JANNIS, HEPWORTH, 
LEZAMIZ, & JANIS, CHTD., P.O. BOX 2582, BOISE, ID 83701; 
AND 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
L The above named Appellant Reed .J. T ayIol appeals against the above-
named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 
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entered in the above entitled action on the 23M day of December, 2008, the Honorable 
Jeff M. Brodie presiding. 
2, Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgments/Orders described in paragraph I above are appealable Orders under and 
pursuant to Rules 4 and l1(a)(1), tA.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends 
to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression); 
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect 
others: 
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud, 
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, 
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to 
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the 
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action. 7 
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar 
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of 
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation. and tortious 
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and 
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of 
any of the foregoing causes of action? 
C. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for 
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney 
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the 
attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the 
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest? 
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the 
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to 
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by 
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation? 
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e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation. who is also a secured 
creditor of the revenues of the corporation. have standing to assert 
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the 
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation? 
f Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hislher scope of 
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege? 
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests 
when the representation was approved by persons with 
director/officer conflicts of interest? 
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person from asserting 
claims against an attorney. when the plaintiff does not have privity 
of contract with the attorney, for violations of Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Act? 
i. In considering a motion to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it 
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an 
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which 
are not in the record for that case? 
j. Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged 
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of 
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
L Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related 
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to 
dismiss under !Rep 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the 
documents to the other party? 
ffi. If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the 
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the 
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorney-
client privilege been waived and must the documents be produced 
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel? 
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n. If fdaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can 
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to LRC.P. 
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney 
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of 
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from 
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have 
known that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have 
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation 
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an 
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of at least two 
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's 
three different clients. 
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special 
duties. and/ot third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney 
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1) 
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the 
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the 
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which 
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the non-
client has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer 
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is 
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties 
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are 
insufficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds 
may have been wrongfully transferred from the corporation client 
by the very individuals directing the litigation (5) the parent 
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by 
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by 
the parent corporation client who is highly insolvent? 
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the 
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho '5 Constitution) to 
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes 
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a 
security interest andlor pursue causes of actions action attorneys 
relating to anyone or mOle the foregoing? 
4. There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is not requested. 
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6. Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's 
record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.: 
a. This Notice of Appeal; 
b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; 
c. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; 
d. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss~ 
e. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including 
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint); 
f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend Complaint; and 
g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint. 
7. I certify that: 
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter 
because a transcript has not been requested. 
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for 
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested. 
c The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 
DATED this 30lh day of January, 2009. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
BY:~~ 
Michael S. Bi~lIate 
Attorneys fOfV Reed Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30111 day of January, 2009, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the following: 
~_HANDDELIVERY 
X U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
--FAX TRANSMISSION 
>< EMAIL (.pdf attachment) 
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JohnJ. Janis 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
Michael S. Bissell 
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J, TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GAR YD. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: C V tl8 -01765 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Category: A.t. 
Fee: $88.00 
Reed 1. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, BISSELL & 
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by 
reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of action): 
I. PARTIES 
I. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in I.C. § 48-608. 
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2, Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") is an 
Idaho limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is 
vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants. 
3, Defendant Gary D. Babbitt is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
4. Defendant D. John Ashby is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
5. Defendant Patrick V. Collins is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney practicing law in the state ofldaho with and for Hawley Troxell, 
6. Defendant Richard A. Riley is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
7. Jane Does I-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that 
paJiicipated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants 
with and for Hawley Troxell. 
II. JURISDICTION, VENUE AND CLAIMS 
8. The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez 
Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being 'named as defendants in Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. The Defendants committed tortious acts and/or assisted in the 
commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious acts 
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
9. Damages in this action exceed $10,000. Jurisdiction and venue are, 
therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. 
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10. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc., the only 
shareholder of AlA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and 
the largest creditor of AlA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 
and AlA Services Corporation is insolvent). AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc,'s value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus 
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Therefore, Plaintiff Reed 
J. Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain 
damages, 
III. FACTS 
1 I. At all material times, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 
by AlA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff 
Reed J, Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services Corporation. At all 
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AlA Services Corporation's debt 
and contractual obligations owed to Reed 1. Taylor. 
J 2, ALA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000,000 promissory 
note when it failed to pay the note when it matured on August 1, 2005. Although 
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on August 1, 2005, demand 
for payment was properly served upon AlA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed 1. 
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Richard 
A. Riley pursuant to the notice provisions of the agreements. AlA Services Corporation 
was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent from said date. 
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13. Since 1996, as security for the oVer $8,500,000 owed by AlA Services 
Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all 
of the stock of ALA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of 
ALA Insurance, Inc. and ALA Services Corporation. Pursuant to the Amended and 
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1; 1996, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor had the 
contractual right upon default of AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of ALA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor's right to vote the stock of ALA Insurance was also perfected through ALA 
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was 
coupled with an interest as required by I.C § 30-1-722. 
14. On February 22, 2007, Reed T Taylor voted the stock of ALA Insurance, 
Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided 
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested 
directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the 
Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor'S valid vote 
of the stock of AlA Insurance, Tnc. and refused to surrender control as required. The 
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties 
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and 
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there 
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so' was an intentional violation and 
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and 
funds of ALA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded. 
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IS. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and 
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches 
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV -07-00208 
("Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. "), and therein Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AlA Services Corporation's default of 
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote 
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J. 
Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AlA Services 
Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. 
16. With the Defendants full knowledge, Reed 1. Taylor's claims asserted in 
Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et 01. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, 
conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others 
(including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), including but not limited to claims that R. 
John Taylor had wrongfully transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance, Inc.'s cash to 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., for no consideration and had transferred 
approximately $700,000 of the assets of AlA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. for no consideration. R. John Taylor was at all material times also an 
interested director, officer and shareholder of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Also 
included in the civil action were other claims that R. John Taylor and others had engaged 
in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions with AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA 
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Insurance, Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, and for the 
personal benefit of R. John Taylor and other interested parties (including Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.). 
17. In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AlA Services 
Corporation, et al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AlA 
Services Corporation, a corporation, and AlA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and also 
represented the interests of R. John Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties 
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times 
John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AlA Services Corporation and ALA 
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AlA Services Corporation. The 
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of 
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to 
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, the Defendants undertook to 
represent the three named clients AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with 
the other. 
18. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the 
Defendants in May 2007, that it was not appropriate for the Defendants to represent AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and/or to take direction from R. John 
Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact that R. John Taylor was an 
interested party. Despite the warning and demands made by Reed J. Taylor'S attorney, 
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Roderick C. Bond, the Defendants also appeared and represented Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., which was created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a breach of 
the Defendants' fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AlA Services 
Corporation and ALA Insurance, Inc., and was a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care. 
19. The Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a loint 
Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., 
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. lohn Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in 
Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and 
diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and duty of care, and 
to the detriment AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and Reed 1. Taylor. In 
Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at., a Joint Defense Agreements was not 
pennissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and 
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent 
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the loint Defense Agreement 
was also independently not appropriate or pennitted when certain parties to a joint 
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. The 
Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. lohn Taylor 
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent 
conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, 
while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of fees and 
costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care. 
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20. The Defendants assisted AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. Jolm Taylor, and others in entering into various 
inappropriate agreements and transactions which were in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and their duty of care, were not in the best interests of the 
corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, constituted fraud and/or the 
inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to AlA Services Corporation andlor 
AlA Insurance, Inc., were not arms-length transactions, andlor were done so without 
requiring AlA Services Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc. andlor Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by separate 
independent uninterested parties. 
21. As attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants 
owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, 
and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the 
assets and businesses of the corporation, and since AlA Services Corporation was 
insolvent, to its creditors including Reed J. Taylor. As attorney for AlA Services 
Corporation, and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume 
representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually andlor through a Joint 
Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties. 
22. As attorneys for AlA Insurance, Inc., an entity, the Defendants owed 
duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care and the 
law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the 
Corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and 
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assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but 
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in 
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AlA Insurance, Inc. 
and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed 1. 
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of 
the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement, 
and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie 
Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). 
23. As attorneys representing the interests of R. John Taylor through a Joint 
Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through 
taking directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested 
and should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R. John 
Taylor by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendant's owed a duty to their corporate 
clients not to assume representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties. The Defendants failed to notify or 
obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate parties or 
disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
Defendants' duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of Formation of the corporations, 
all to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in a 
Joint Defense Agreement. 
733'1 
24. As present and/or fonner attomeys' for AlA Services Corporation and/or 
AlA Insurance, Inc. (individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) the 
Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R. John 
Taylor or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. 
or represent or assist R. John Taylor in Donna Taylor v. R. John Taylor because the 
Defendants' loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA 
Insurance, Inc. Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way represent Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any joint defense of Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James 
Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. 
should have been asserting claims against Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other, 
and other interested and uninterested parties. 
25. Defendants represented, and continue to represent, the interests of R. John 
Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge 
that R. lohn Taylor is an interested party and director of AlA Services Corporation and 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the 
course of litigation involving the Defendants' clients, AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc., while also inappropriately representing Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor. 
26. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants 
have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that has 
represented ALA Services and AlA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation, 
and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., the law firm that formerly represented AlA 
Service Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, ef al. 
During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others 
have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves, 
AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., 
which transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to 
the detriment of AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee. 
27. Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial 
because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R. 
John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., and/or other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties. The acts of fraud, 
fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duties 
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AlA Insurance, Inc. and 
AlA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John 
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's 
contractual rights to control and operate AlA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately 
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or 
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested parties to engage in tortious 
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the 
detriment of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and 
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proximately caused damages to Reed 1. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) 
While representing R. John Taylor, individually or through a Joint Defense Agreement, 
the Defendants have had full knowledge that their client is an interested party and 
director of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation 
involving the Defendants' former clients, AlA Services Corporation and ALA Insurance, 
Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others 
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with 
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious 
transactions involving himself, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed 
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee. 
28. In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or 
joint defense of R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc., Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, and Michael Cashman) the Defendants accepted payments of attorneys fees 
and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or assisting in inappropriate 
corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others. 
29. Over the course of the litigation in Reed J Taylor v. AlA Services 
Corporation, et al., Reed 1. Taylor'S attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, 
Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on numerous occasions that their conduct 
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violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, was inappropriate, and 
constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including 
R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential legal 
claims against them. In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their 
inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed 1. Taylor. 
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite 
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed 1. 
Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be constmed as 
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the 
detriment of Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor. 
30. The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested 
parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees, 
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AlA Services 
Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other 
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims 
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted 
andlor failed to prevent interested parties (induding R. John Taylor) in transferring the 
long-term employees of AlA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while 
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation that the 
corporations were being operated properly andlor failing to advise the Court of the 
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of andlor 
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director 
fees of $20,000 per year when AlA Services Corporation was insolvent. 
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31. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his 
attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and 
funds of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets 
from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and 
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants 
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and 
the law. Despite Reed 1. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C. 
Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or 
protected because of the wrongful acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the 
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to 
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes. 
32. - In various motions, responses arid affidavits submitted to the court in 
Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et aI., the Defendants made arguments that did not 
benefit AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor, 
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted 
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other 
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties 
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James 
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of 
Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AlA 
Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual 
when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others. 
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33. Despite Reed 1. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C. 
Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the 
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. John Taylor and 
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and 
Reed 1. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick 
C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AlA Insurance, Inc. 's improper guarantee of a 
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused 
to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the 
existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees, and threatened to take legal action 
against Reed 1. Taylor if he tried to rescind or terminate the improper guarantee (since 
Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the balance of the loan has increased by over 
$5,500,000 to over $10,500,000). I 
34. The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys' 
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al. and for other 
related and/or unrelated legal services. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through 
his attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so. 
35. Through the acts of the Defendants, the value of ALA Insurance, Inc. and 
the assets of AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in 
value, the corporations' value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds 
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the 
I The $15,000,000 loan subject to the guarantee is believed to be in technical default. Damages for any loss 
from the guarantee would accrue upon the time of lhe loss or threatened litigation by the lender and, 
accord ingly, would be additional damages asserted against the Defendants at that ti me. 
Defendants, ownership of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was vested and has 
remained vested in interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor 
Reed J. Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed J. 
Taylor's demands (through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be 
taken for the interests of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants 
have refused to take action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including 
R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). 
36. Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked 
merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a 
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation. et aI., which 
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the 
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Defendants' duty of care. The Defendants also refused to make any 
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AlA Services Corporation as 
requested by Reed J. Taylor. 
37. The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor 
and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed 1. Taylor and Donna 1. 
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares 
of ALA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a 
member of the board of directors of AlA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the 
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed 
J. Taylor and Donna 1. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of ALA 
Services Corporation, which has further far reaching ramifications and results in 
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additional damages against the Defendants. 
38. With full knowledge of AlA Services Corporation's obligations to ensure 
that Reed 1. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of AlA Services Corporation ' s 
board until they were paid in full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in 
inappropriate board meetings and/or take inappropriate action based upon board meetings 
held by interested directors without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present and 
without providing them the opportunity to be present, which further results in all such 
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the 
associated damages. 
39. The Defendants represented AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc. in litigation with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AlA 
Insurance, Inc. by and through commission in which Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor held a 
security interest of which the Defendants had full knowledge. The litigation was 
resolved, however, instead of titling the $1 ,200,000 Mortgage that was received as 
settlement in the name of AlA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants titled the mortgage only in 
the name of AlA Services Corporation in an inappropriate scheme to keep the mortgage 
from AlA Insurance, Inc. and Reed 1. Taylor. The Defendants then inappropriately 
represented AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge of the 
$1,200,000 Mortgage to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of 
the Defendants' services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of 
care, and the law. The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify 
disinterested parties or the Court that AlA Services Corporation had inappropriately 
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pledged its sole remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA 
insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for the Defendants' services 
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the law. 
40. The Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court 
III Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In 
several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the 
best interests of the corporations or Reed 1. Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations 
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when 
the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their 
assets safeguarded). 
41. The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other 
interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided 
and bornc by ALA Insurance, Inc. and/or AlA Services Corporation for the benefit of 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties. Upon 
infonnation and belief, the Defendants have assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion 
letters to auditors of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties in transferring 
and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of ALA Insurance, Inc. 
and/or AlA Services Corporation for the benefit of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc 
while providing no or little consideration in return. 
42. The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive 
Officer's Agreement, which, upon infonnation and belief, was drafted by Defendant 
Richard A. Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had fuJI knowledge of the 
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existence and terms of R. John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement with ALA 
Services Corporation. Even though R. John Taylor has breached the tenus of his 
employment contract with ALA Services Corporation by competing against ALA Services 
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate 
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AlA Insurance, Inc., and other 
inappropriate actions, the Defendants have intentionally refused to act in the best interests 
of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J. 
Taylor, to the detriment of Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor. 
43. The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining 
funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AlA Services 
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed 
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AlA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring 
shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect 
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested 
parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care. 
44. In April 2007, the Defendants penuitted and/or assisted interested parties 
in holding a joint board meeting of AlA Services Corporation and ALA Insurance, Inc. 
with full knowledge that Reed 1. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally 
denied their right to be on the board of AlA Services Corporation and participating in 
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J. 
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants penuitted and/or assisted R. 
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AlA Services 
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Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AlA 
Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that 
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were 
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent 
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of 
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately 
permitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to 
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley 
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of 
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' 
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care. 
45. Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take 
instrllctions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AlA 
Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. knowing that the boards are not properly 
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant 
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, their duty of care, and/or the law. 
IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
46. The Defendants have damaged Reed 1. Taylor by aiding and abetting 
and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) 
in the commission of tortious acts. 
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47. The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including 
R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common 
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc.). 
48. The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor 
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial 
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. Jolm Taylor and Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties. The Defendants' conduct also 
constitutes the assistance of interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.) with the tortious interference of AlA Services Corporation and 
Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the Defendants had 
intimate knowledge. 
49. The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John 
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing 
tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed 1. Taylor. 
50. The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others 
(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the 
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed 1. 
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
51. Reed 1. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in 
all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
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Insurance, Inc. 
52. All of the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as 
collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AlA Services Corporation. By way of 
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed 1. Taylor is entitled to 
possession and control of all of the assets of ALA Insurance, Inc. 
53. The Defendants were fully aware of Reed 1. Taylor's rights to property in 
which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact, Defendant 
Richard A. Riley represented AlA Services Corporation in the redemption of Reed J. 
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
and other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters 
relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and 
warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments counter to the representations made 
in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley. 
Defendants also assisted in the commission of torts by R. John Taylor, Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties by representing the corporations in 
various inappropriate transactions. 
54. The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed 
$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such payments the 
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care. 
55. The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of 
AlA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant 
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance 
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but 
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from 
AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of 
attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et 
ai., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other 
disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor. The 
Defendants also assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million 
Mortgage owned by AlA Services Corporation to facilitate the payment of funds to them. 
The Defendants have also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' fees and costs 
rendered for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which were paid by the money and/or 
assets of AlA Services Corporation and/or ALA Insurance, Inc. 
56. The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property 
and money belonging to AlA Services Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J. 
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or 
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor 
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and 
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such 
property and money. 
57. The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has 
damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
58. The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in 
acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive· and/or a 
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violation of I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and 
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices in trade pertaining to the 
practice oflaw pursuant to I.C. § 48-601, et seq. 
59. The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J. 
Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a). 
As such, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject 
to treble damages pursuant to I.C. § 48-608. 
VII. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
60. AlA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its 
insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed 1. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to 
Reed 1. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director 
and officer of ALA Insurance, Inc. 
61. The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing 
similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their 
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AlA Services 
Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the 
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, 
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the 
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to 
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to 
AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly 
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others 
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and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John 
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). 
62. The Defendants owed AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. 
and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, 
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation 
in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the 
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of car~"). The Defendants breached 
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the 
corporations and Reed 1. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed 1. Taylor. 
63. The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor, including, without 
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty. 
64. The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of 
the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged the corporations and 
Reed 1. Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
1. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve 
(12) on all claims and damages so triable. 
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor prays for the following relief: 
l. For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $10,500,000 
in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble damages), the exact 
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of 
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pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 
2. For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble 
damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48-
608(2); 
3. For a jUdgment reqUlrmg the disgorgement of the payments of all 
attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA 
Insurance, Inc.; 
4. For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional 
damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608; 
5. For such other relief as may be available to Reed 1. Taylor pursuant to I.C. 
§ 48-60 I, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary 
injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation; 
6. For an award of Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, I.C. § 48-
608, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121; and 
7. For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
ti . 
DA TED this~ day of August, 2008. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & IRBY PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, VVAl 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-71 00 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Alttomeys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF THE 
STAlTE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAl YLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GMY D. BAlBBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
AlSHBY, an individual; PAlTRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A 
RILEY, an individual; HAl VVLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HA VVLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unlrnown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys, Campbell, 
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, hereby responds to Defendants' (collectively "Hawley Troxell") 
Motion to Dismiss. 
. .... __ ............ _ .................. _--- ...... . 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reed Taylor's claims involve factual and legal claims that entitle him to damages 
and that cannot be resolved through an LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. Indeed, dismissal is not 
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appropriate because of the single factual issue of whether Hawley Troxell ever had 
authority to represent AIA Insurance or AlA Services. Similarly, Reed Taylor's 
appropriate and warranted direct claims against Hawley Troxell defeat the Motion to 
Dismiss as he is the only person truly entitled to pursue the claims. Moreover, and 
notwithstanding Hawley Troxell's lack of authority to act on behalf of AIA Insurance and 
AlA Services, it exceeded the scope of any purported legal representation, and as such it 
is liable for the claims and corresponding damages requested in Reed Taylor's 
Complaint, which are more than adequately pled under Idaho notice pleading standard. 1 
n.FACTUALBACKGROUND 
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA 
Insurance"), the only shareholder of AIA Insurance holding all of its shares, a secured 
creditor, and the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services"). See 
Complaint, p. 3, , 10. AIA Services is significantly insolvent and its assets are 
insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. Id. Consequently, Reed 
Taylor is bringing claims personal to him and claims derivatively held by him, all directly 
against Hawley Troxell for certain damages, i.e, he is pursuing all claims directly against 
Hawley Troxell. See Complaint 
Since 1996, Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of 
the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA 
Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4, 1 13. 
On February 22,2007, Reed Taylor voted the shares of AIA Insurance pursuant to 
his contractual rights and as authorized under Idaho law. See Complaint, p. 4, , 14. 
1 Even if the Court finds that Reed Taylor should not be permitted to bring certain claims directly against 
Hawley Troxell, the issue is effectively moot as Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor will bring the same claims 
against Hawley Troxell derivatively on behalf of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
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In violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell undertook the 
representation of AlA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
("CropUSA"), each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other. See 
Complaint, p. 6, ~ 17. Hawley Troxell's purported representation of CropUSA resulted 
in the breach of their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services and AlA Insurance. See 
Complaint, p. 7, 1 18. 
Hawley Troxell owed duties to Reed Taylor as a creditor pledgee of AlA 
Insurance, who voted the shares of AIA Insurance. See Complaint, pp. 8-9, 1 22. 
Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals 
from appropriate parties in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct See 
Complaint, p. 9, 1 23. Hawley Troxell was advised on numerous occasions that its 
conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and constituted the aiding and 
abetting of others. See Complaint, p. 13, 129. Hawley Troxell's disregard of warnings 
can only be construed as intentional improper acts, all of whlch were to the detriment of 
Reed Taylor. Id. 
Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor and other 
interested parties in stopping ail payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor. See 
Complaint, p. 16,137. They also assisted R. John Taylor and others in preventing Reed 
Taylor from being a member of the board of directors of AIA Services. Id. Moreover, 
and with knowledge of Reed Taylor'S right to be on the board of AIA Services, 
Defendants participated in board meetings, with such meetings and board decisions being 
null and void. See Complaint, p. 17,138. 
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Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining funds, assets, and 
property to defraud Reed Taylor. See Complaint, p. 19, ,. 43. Defendants owed duties 
under the law to Reed Taylor to preserve and protect the assets and businesses of AIA 
Services since it was insolvent See Complaint, p. 8, ,. 21. 
Defendants took instructions and/or directives from unauthorized boards of AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated in violation 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct See Complaint, p. 20, ,. 45. 
Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint Defense 
Agreement knowing that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, R. John Taylor, and 
the other individual defendants had irreconcilable conflicts of interest and that the 
agreement assisted others to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims. See 
Complaint, p. 7, ,. 19. 
Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others 
(including Crop USA) in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil 
conspiracy, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties and inappropriate 
transactions thereby proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock 
pledgee. See Complaint, p. 11-12, , 27. 
ID. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. Hawley Troxell Cannot Meet Idaho's Stringent 1200(6) Standard. 
1. The Complaint Properly Alleges Valid Causes Of Action. 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court looks only at the 
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City 
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of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to 
support the claims." Id at 104. "Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a 
complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm In on 
Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217,506 P.2d 112 (1973). Idaho has adopted 
a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 PJd 857 
(2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief..." Id., quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly 
bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings." Cook, 135 Idaho at 33. All 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. LR.C.P.8(t). 
Motions to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor because of 
the waste of time in case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to 
obtain a determination of claims on the merits. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 
404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Id. 
Reed Taylor agrees with Hawley Troxell's assertions that a motion to dismiss is 
addressed solely to the sufficiency of the complaint and that all inferences from the facts 
alleged in the complaint must be drawn in his favor. Hawley Troxell also correctly points 
out that the issues for the Court include whether Reed Taylor has alleged sufficient facts 
to support his claims, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and whether he is entitled 
to offer evidence to support the claims. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, p. 4. Applying 
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these standards, Reed Taylor'S Complaint clearly states claims upon which relief can be 
granted, i.e., alleges facts - together with all favorable inferences therefrom - that 
support cognizable claims under Idaho law. 
In a nutshell, Reed Taylor claims that Hawley Troxell conspired and aided and 
abetted in the breach of fiduciary duties, conspiracy, fraud, and tortious interference. 
Reed Taylor claims that Hawley Troxell conspired with and aided and abetted John 
Taylor andior CropUSA in protecting John Taylor's interests to the detriment of the 
interests of Hawley Troxell's other clients, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. In addition, 
Hawley Troxell directly interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights in assuming to 
represent AIA Insurance without authority as well as conspiring with and aiding and 
abetting John Taylor andior CropUSA in the interfering with Reed Taylor'S contractual 
rights. In addition, Hawley Troxell is directly liable for the conversion of property in 
which Reed Taylor possessed a valid interest as well as conspiring with and aiding and 
abetting John Taylor to do the same. 
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint provides sufficient notice to Hawley Troxell of 
the claims asserted against it Hawley Troxell has failed to meet the heavy burden 
required to obtain a dismissal of claims pursuant to I.RC.P. 12(b)(6), and Hawley 
Troxell's Motion to Dismiss should be denied in full. 2 
2. Regardless Of How Novel One Or More Of Reed Taylor's Causes Of 
Action May Be Under Idaho Law, They Are Valid Causes Of ActiODB. 
"Thycourt should be especially reluctant to dismissonthe_pleadingwhere .. the 
asserted theory of liabilitY is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories 
2 Although Idaho Jaw only requires notice pleading, the Court should pennit Reed Taylor to file an 
amended complaint to the extent that the Court may believe that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a 
cause of action. 
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be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition." Stewart 
v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P .2d 895 (1968), citing Shull v. Pilot Life 
Ins. Co., 313 F .2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added). 
Regardless of whether Idaho law has adopted the legal authority of any of the 
claims being pursued by Reed Taylor, he should be permitted to plead and pursue all of 
his claims. 
3. The Proper Test Of The Validity Of Reed Taylor's Complaint Is 
Through A Motion For Summary Judgment After Discovery Has 
Been Conducted. 
"The motion to dismiss serves its most useful purpose where from the pleadings 
and documented proof available no controverted fact issue remains and only questions of 
law are to be decided." Stewart v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895 
(1968) (citing Shull v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 313 F .2d 445, 447 (5 th Cir. 1963)). "The 
validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the summary judgment procedure of 
.I.R.C.P. 56." Stewart, 92 Idaho at 531; Duffin v.Idaho Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 
1002,1013,895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995). 
To the extent that any of Reed Taylor's claims involve factual issues (which they 
all do, to the extent Hawley Troxell wants the claims dismissed), such claims should be 
resolved at trial or on summary judgment All of Reed Taylor'S claims survive an attack 
based uponI.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
4. H The Court Finds That Reed Taylor's Complaint Is Deficient In Any 
Respect, Reed Taylor Should Be Permitted To File An Amended 
Complaint. 
If a court finds that a complaint fails to state a claim, then the court can permit the 
party to file an amended complaint to cure any defects. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 
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609, 611, 533 P.2d 730 (1975) (the Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, but allowed 
him 15 days leave to file an amended complaint). Thus, to the extent that the Court may 
fmd that Reed Taylor's Complaint may contain any defects, Reed Taylor should be 
permitted to file an amended complaint curing such defects. 
B. Reed Taylor Has Standing To Pursue Claims Against Hawley Troxell, 
And Such Claims Are Not Subject To Any Scope Of Representation 
Defenses Or Litigation Privilege 
The issue of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened harm as well as 
past injury. Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). "An 
attorney can be liable to a nonclient, even an adversary in litigation, for fraud or deceit. 
Duty is not at issue, because wrong is intentional conduct." 1 Legal Malpractice § 6:7 
(2008) (internal citations omitted) (empbasis added); see also e.g., Banco Popular North 
America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing there could be a valid cause of 
action for a conspiracy to defraud a creditor by helping a client transfer assets). 
"[A] lawyer is subject to liability to a ... nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in 
similar circumstances." See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008). 
This basis concept of lawyer liability is discussed in numerous Comments in § 56: 
If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the 
nonlawyer civilly liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the 
same activities by a lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the 
lawyer liable ... 
See Restate.II.1t!Ilt (Third) OILll,WOove.1Jliug Li;lW. § 56 (2D08), comment b. 
When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to 
civil liability to others, those others may seek to hold the lawyer liable 
along with or instead of the client. Whether a lawyer is liable depends on 
the elements of liability under the law upon which the claim of liability is 
predicated and may therefore turn on such facts as how the lawyer's acts 
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contributed to the plaintiff's harm, what the lawyer lmew or believed as to 
the relevant facts and law, the lawyer'S intent, and how culpable the 
client's conduct is under the law. 
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008), Comment c. "A law firm 
is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or 
omission of any principal or employee of the firm ... " See Restatement (Third) of Law 
Governing Law § 58 (2008) ("When finn principals are personally liable vicariously, 
they are jointly and severally liable." See Comment g.) 
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint asserts valid causes of action against Hawley 
Troxell for conspiracy, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, tortious interference, and 
unfair and deceptive acts in trade (and aiding and abetting of the foregoing). As 
discussed in further detail below, these claims are all independent of Reed Taylor's rigbts 
to bring derivative claims directly against Hawley Troxell, i.e., Reed Taylor is not 
required to sue derivatively on bebalf of AIA Insurance and AlA Services, but may bring 
direct claims because of the significant factual and legal circumstances discussed below. 
These collective claims are all excluded from the any assertion of litigation privilege. 
See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 29-32. 
C. Reed Taylor Has Standing To Directly Bring Certain Derivative Claims 
Against Hawley Troxell. 
1. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Stock Pledgee. 
A stock pledgee has standing to bring direct claims against third parties. See e.g., 
.. Qus.laft[)flV, (Jys.taHPlJ .. 47 Wn, App, 272, 278, 734P.2d 949,953 CWn.App. 1987); 
Empire Life Ins. Co. of America v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Ritchie v. 
McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897); see also 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2032 (2008) 
("A pledgee of corporate stock has an interest therein that entitles him or her to be heard 
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in court of equity concerning the preservation and protection of the assets and property of 
the corporation."). "The pledgee may file suit in equity to preserve the stock and to 
protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at least, as the pledgor ... The pledgee is 
also interested in the preservation of the corporate property and in preventing it from 
passing out of the hands of the corporation ... " See 12A Fletcher Cye. Corp. § 5651 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
Here, Reed Taylor has standing to pursue claims directly against Hawley Troxell 
because he is the sale pledgee of all of the shares in AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's 
actions are damaging AIA Insurance, impairing the value of AIA Insurance, diverting 
AIA Insurance's assets, and inappropriately assisting and aiding and abetting John Taylor 
and others to loot AIA Insurance. All of the foregoing acts have resulted in money and 
assets being inappropriately diverted out of AIA Insurance and claims not being pursued 
against Hawley Troxell, John Taylor and others for the recovery of AIA Insurance's 
funds, assets and damages. As the sale pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's shares, Reed 
Taylor has standing to pursue the claims directly against Hawley Troxell. 
2. In Addition To His Rights AB A Pledgee, Reed Taylor Has Standing 
Because He Stands In The Shoes Of AlA Insurance's Sole 
Shareholder. 
'The pledgee may file suit. .. to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at 
least, as the pledgor..." See 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5651 (2008) (emphasis added). 
Generally, shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, i.e., on behalf of the 
corporation. However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a direct action without bringing the , 
claims derivatively in the name of the corporation. See e.g., Steelman v. MallOlY, 110 
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Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986) ("Since ... directors in this small closely held 
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to Steelman, as minority shareholder, we cannot agree 
with appellants' contention that this case should have been dismissed because it is a 
'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit") (emphasis added); see also 
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 
(Utah 1998) (a direct action may be brought when based upon a "contract to which 
[plaintiff] is a party, or on a right belonging severally to [plaintiff], or on a fraud affecting 
[plaintiff] directly ... ") (quoting 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 5911 (1970)); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (N.D. 1991); 
Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410,412, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. App. 1980) overruled 
on other grounds (" ... plaintiff had standing, both derivatively and directly, to sue on the 
alleged contract and for an accounting."); Schumaker v. Schumaker, 469 N.W.2d 793, 
798 (N.D. 1991). 
Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's 
standing to pUIsue direct claims: 
A shareholder may sue directly for harm to himself or herself that is 
separate and distinct from that suffered by the corporation . 
... Under some authority, the analysis for determining whether a 
stockholder's action should be classified as direct or derivative turns on 
the determination of who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the 
suing stockholder individually, and who would receive the benefit of 
recovery or other remedy. Most courts hold, however, that a shareholder 
may have standing to bring an action arising from an injury to the 
Gorporation if the injury is the result oithe violation of duty owed directly 
to the shareholder, or if the shareholder sustains an injury that is peculiar 
to him or her alone', and does not fall alike upon other stockholders, even 
. if the corporation was similarly harmed . 
... When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both 
direct and derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action. 
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... Some jurisdictions, however, permit a shareholder in a close 
corporation to proceed directly rather than derivatively under some 
circumstances. In such a jurisdiction, the decision whether to allow a 
party to proceed with a direct suit in lieu of a derivative action is entrusted 
to the court's discretion. 
In determining when a shareholder of a close corporation may proceed 
with a direct action, rather than a derivative action, courts consider 
whether a direct action will: (l) unfairly expose the corporation or the 
defendants to a multiplicity of actions; (2) materially prejudice the 
interests of the corporation's creditors; or (3) interfere with the fair 
distribution of recovery among all interested persons. 
See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
The distinction between individual and derivative actions has been explained as 
follows: 
[1]t is generally held that a stockholder may maintain an action in his own 
right for an injury directly affecting him, although the corporation also 
may have a cause of action growing out of the same wrong, where it 
appears that the injury to the stockholder resulted from the vi01ation of 
some special duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having 
its origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiff's status as a 
shareholder. 
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585 (2002) quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 2249 (1986). In other words: 
An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the 
complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock 
or property and not injury to the plaintiffs individual interest as a 
shareholder. 
McCann, 138 Idaho at 233 quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2250 (1986); see also 
St?eI111Cll'l v. MClllQry. 110 Jdaho.510. 512-13, 716P.2d 1282 (1986). The definition of 
"gravamen" is "[t]he substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint." 
Black's (Seventh Edition) Law Dictionary, p. 708 (1999). 
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Here, Reed Taylor's claims are based upon the fact that the money and assets of 
AIA Insurance are being tortiously misappropriated, converted and looted to his 
detriment. He is the only shareholder of AlA Insurance as the pledgee of all of its 
outstanding shares, he holds a security interest in all of the commissions of AlA 
Insurance, he is a creditor owed over $8,500,000, and he is the only bona-fide party 
entitled to recover and possess all of the moneys recovered through his direct claims. In 
short he is entitled to all of the assets and funds of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
Moreover, AlA Insurance is not bringing any claims against the responsible parties, 
including Hawley Troxell. There is no better example of a case warranting direct claims. 
These reasons, along with the others set forth in this Response, makes Reed Taylor 
essentially the only person entitled to bring the claims. 
3. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Secured Creditor Of AIA Services. 
When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has 
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g., 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 
P.2d 281 eel App. 1983); us. v. McCleskey lvlills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 eGa 1969). The 
rights of a secured creditor are extensive: 
In some circumstances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition 
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most 
cases w~en a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral, the 
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the 
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an 
i:lppr:()p:rji:lt~ c;!:l$.(;,maintamClJli:lctiQu for conversion ..... The secured party 
may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, 
may only have one satisfaction .... 
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a 
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one 
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom 
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property is transferred, or a third party who exercises dominion over the 
collateral or its proceeds ... 
See 79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions § 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Here, Reed Taylor holds a perfected security interests in AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance's commissions and related receivables and all of the stock of AlA Insurance. 
In holding a security interest in all of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor's security interest and 
corresponding rights are paramount to all others, and his security interest in all of the 
commissions of AlA Services is no less significant as they are the company's sale source 
of revenue. 
4. Reed Taylor Has Standing To Pursue His Claims As The Creditor Of 
AIA Services. 
A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims. See 
e.g., Board of Trustees of Teamsters v. Foodtown, Inc.} 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Cir. 
2002); Asarco LLC v. Americas Min. Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007) (making claim 
against directors for breach of fiduciary duty). 
Here, Reed Taylor's position as a creditor owed over $8,500,000 and who has a 
partial summary judgment against AIA Services gives him standing to pursue direct 
claims, and even more entitled to standing in light of the fact that he is also a secured 
creditor and pledgee. Nevertheless, Hawley Troxell argues that Reed Taylor has no 
standing, as a creditor, to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell or AIA Services' 
directors fo~b~ach of fid~ci~ d~ti~~.:3 Se~H~~leYT;~~ell;~M~ti~~. pp.il-13; s~~ 
3 However, even if accepted as true and found to be fully applicable to this case, Hawley Troxell's 
argument does not apply to the rights Reed Taylor has as a pledgee (sbarebolder) and secured creditor, the 
issues raised will be moot when Reed Taylor also files derivative claims against Hawley Troxell. For this 
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also North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewolla, 
930 A.2d 92 (DeLSupr. 2007) (creditor may not pursue direct claims for breaches of 
fiduciary duties when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency); Production Resources 
Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 772 (DeL Ch. 2004) (recognizing that a 
creditor is owed fiduciary duties when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency). 
However, Gheewalla and Production Resources are not applicable to the facts and legal 
issues in this case.4 
First, it should be noted that AIA Services is not in the zone of insolvency. AlA 
Services is beyond insolvent and its assets are estimated to be over $6 Million less than 
the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. AIA Services does not even have sufficient 
assets to pay Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees in Taylor v. AM Services, et aZ. Second, Reed 
Taylor is a secured creditor, unlike the apparent general creditors in Gheewalla and 
Production Resources. Third, Reed Taylor is entitled to be on the board of AIA Services, 
and this contractual right has been thwarted with the assistance of Hawley Troxell. 
Fourth, Neither Hawley Troxell, John Taylor or the other interested individuals are 
pursuing any claims on behalf of AlA Services because they all know the roads to claims 
lead directly back to John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, CropUSA, and the others. Fifth, the 
defense of AIA Services is obviously being conducted for no legitimate basis other than 
to protect John Taylor, Hawley Troxell (e.g., its various unlawful opinion letters to the 
auditors of AlA Insurance and CropUSA assisting in unlawfully transferring millions of 
dollars of assets and other things of value from AlA Insurance), and the other individuals. 
reason alone, Reed Taylor should be pennitted to bring the claims directly to conserve resources, 
rarticularly since he is the only person entitled to any funds recovered. 
Hawley Troxell does not challenge Reed Taylor's standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims 
directly against Hawley Troxell and the others as the pledgee/shareholder of AIA Insurance. Nevertheless, 
Reed Taylor provides authority supporting such direct claims in this Response. 
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5. Reed Taylor Has Standing As The Only Authorized Director And 
Officer Of AlA Insurance. 
A director or officer may bring claims against other parties in a quasi-derivative 
action. Law of Corp. Off's. & Dirs.: Rts., Duties & Liabs. § 9:27 (2008) (citing New 
York law); see also Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986) 
(recognizing a director's rights to bring a direct action in lieu of a derivative action 
(although the director was also a shareholder)). Reed Taylor is the only authorized 
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and, consequently, he has standing to pursue 
claims directly as he is the only party entitled to the funds. 
6. As Both The Director And Sole Shareholder Of AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor Has Standing To Make Direct Claims Against Hawley Troxell. 
Under Idaho law, a shareholder and director of a closely held corporation has 
standing to bring direct claims. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 
(1986); see also 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5651 (2008) ("The pledgee may file suit in 
equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at least, 
as the pledgor ... The pledgee is also interested in the preservation of the corporate 
property ana in preventing it from passing out of the hands of the corporation ... ") 
(emphasis· added). Here, Reed Taylor is the only authorized officer and director of AlA 
Insurance and its only shareholder as the pledgee of all its outstanding shares. Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring direct claims against Hawley Troxell. 
7. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Third Party Beneficiary. 
A party has standing to bring direct claims when he or she is a third party 
beneficiary: 
Thus, a shareholder may have a personal cause of action against a third 
person to recover damages for breach of contract, even though a corporate 
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cause of action and the shareholder's cause of action result from the same 
wrongful acts, such as for mismanagement of the corporate business and 
diversion of assets in breach of an express contract with the shareholder. .. 
... The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the 
corporation and another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary 
action, despite lack of privity between the plaintiff shareholder and the 
defendant, provided the shareholder as an intended beneficiary of the 
contract. .. 
12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing Vogel v. Reed 
Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 126, 177 S.B. 2.d 273, 278 (N.C. 1970) (third-party 
beneficiaries not in privy of contract may bring an action in their own name to "enforce a 
contract made for their benefit...") (other citations omitted). There are other instances in 
which a third-party has standing to pursue claims against an attorney: 
'" [A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but 
who is a third-party beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and 
his or her client Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising 
from representation of a client may be found to exist where the attorney is 
responsible for 'damage caused by his or her negligence to a person 
intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of any lack 
of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary 
for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific 
harm which occurred ... 
. .. Thus, although a legal malpractice claim may accrue only to the 
attorney's client, an attorney may be liable for damages to a third party 
because of events arising out of his or her representation of a client if the 
attorney's acts are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to that third 
person. 
An attorney for a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the third-
party beneficiaries of the trust when the attorney has placed his or her self-
interest about that of the trustee. 
7 Am. Jur.2d Attorneys at Law§234 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, AlA Services promised Reed Taylor to not impair the value of AlA 
Insurance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor upon 
a default, with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley (who was 
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attorney for AIA Services in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares). AIA Services is 
insolvent and Reed Taylor is the only beneficiary entitled to its remaining assets. As 
such, Reed Taylor is a third-party beneficiary of any services purportedly provided by 
Hawley Troxell, who in turn was required to represent the best interests of AIA Insurance 
and AIA Services-but failed to do so. Moreover, Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a 
duty, by and through Richard Riley, to not renege on the terms of an opinion letter 
provided to Reed Taylor. Finally, Hawley Troxell also owed special duties to Reed 
Taylor by way of him being the pledgee of AIA Insurance's shares and the sole officer 
and director of the company. The cumulative effect of all of the above establishes that 
Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor duties.5 
8. Assuming Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing Under Any One Of 
The Above Reasons, He Should Have Standing As A Result Of All Of 
The Above Collective Reasons. 
The gravamen of Reed Taylor's Complaint is that Hawley Troxell has been aiding 
and abetting John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and 
depriving him of money and property to which he is rightfully entitled. Hawley Troxell's 
actions have occurred knowing that duties are owed to Reed Taylor, as a pledgee, 
director, officer, creditor and secured party. There is no other bona-fide shareholder or 
creditors entitled to the remaining assets, funds, and claims owned by AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance. The little remaining assets are being unlawfully utilized to cover up the 
acts of John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, CropUSA and other individuals. Moreover, Reed 
-" 
Taylor is a creditor owed over $9,000,000, he has a security interest in the commissions 
5 Even if Done of the single factual issues creates a third-party beneficiary entitlement for Reed Taylor, a 
special exception should apply based upon Reed Taylor being a secured creditor of AIA Services and AlA 
Insurance, a creditor owed over $8,500,000 by an 'insolvent AlA Services incapable of ever satisfying the 
debt, the pledgee of AlA Insurance, the sole officer and director of AlA Insurance, and the only 
shareholder of AIA Insurance by way of being the pledgee of all of its outstanding shares. 
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of AJA Services and AIA Insurance, he is the only authorized representative of AIA 
Insurance, he is required to be on the board of AIA Services, he has priority over all of 
the assets of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, he has a security interest in all of the AlA 
Insurance's shares, and, as Hawley Troxell admits, AIA Services is insolvent. 
D. Hawley Troxell's Acts, Omissions, And Torts Are Outside Of Any Scope 
Of Purported Legal Representation Because They Were Never 
Authorized To Undertake The Purported Representations. 
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization 
acting through its duly authorized constituents." RPC 1.13(a). 
When a managing officer has been validly removed, he has no authority to 
institute legal proceedings in the name of the corporation. American Center for 
Education, Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal.Rptr. 736, (1978) (citing Templeman v. Grant, 75 
Colo. 519, 534-35, 227 P. 555 (Colo. 1924) ("It is also true that neither the plaintiff 
Templeman nor the former directors ... had any right or authority to assume to be officers 
of the ... corporation, or to institute legal proceedings in the court ... in the name of the 
corporation.")); U.S. v. Wolf, 352 F.Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (the court is not 
bound to defer to the parties' representations as to their authority to hire counsel); 
Safeway Ins. Co. v. Spinale, 641 N.E.2d 834 (Ill.App. 1994) (holding that the 
unauthorized filing of a lawsuit constituted a cause of action and subjected the attorneys 
to exemplary damages). No person has the right to appear as another's attorney without 
the other's authority. Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 159 (1997); Colmex, Inc. v. HarriS, 
WL 2487991 (Wn. App. 2008). An attorney who enters an unauthorized appearance for 
a party is liable to the party for any damage sustained. 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 
219 (1997). Absent authority to retain an attorney, no attorney-client relationship can be 
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established. In re Conservatorship o/Nelson, 587 N.W.2d 649 (Minn.App.1999). 
Here, all of Hawley Troxell's acts exceed the scope of any purported 
representation because they were never authorized to represent AlA Insurance, never 
properly authorized. to represent AlA Services, and because of the irreconcilable and 
unwaivable conflicts of interest they intentionally manufactured in simultaneously 
purportedly representing AlA Insurance, AlA Services, and CropUSA, R. John Taylor, 
and others. 
1. Hawley Troxell Has No Authority To Represent AlA Insurance, And, 
Therefore, Hawley Troxell Has No Scope Of Representation. 
Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AlA Insurance. Under 
the legal authority cited above, Hawley Troxell is not authorized to represent AIA 
Insurance, and is, therefore, liable to Reed for the same reasons and to the same extent as 
any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. 
On December 12, 2006, AIA Services received a notice of default from Reed 
Taylor, a copy of which was provided to Defendant Richard Riley. See Complaint, p. 3, 
, 3. On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance. See 
Complaint, p. 4, ,14, pp. 8-9, '22. Reed Taylor should be in control of AIA Insurance, 
and would be but for the tortious acts of Hawley Troxell and others. See Complaint, p. 5, 
,15. Notwithstanding Hawley Troxell's unauthorized representation, it took instructions 
and/or directives from the unauthorized board of AIA Insurance, namely John Taylor. 
See Complaint, p. 20,,45. 
John Taylor purports to control AIA Insurance and Hawley Troxell purports to 
represent AIA Insurance, however, neither is authorized to do so. Reed Taylor is the only 
authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance and the only person entitled and 
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authorized to control it Significantly, AlA Insurance, by way of Reed Taylor being the 
only authorized director or officer of the company, may not have John Taylor or others 
retain and direct counsel. 5 Therefore, Hawley Troxell's representation of AlA Insurance 
is not authorized and not protected under the law. Consequently, the acts of Hawley 
Troxell on behalf of AlA Insurance are as individuals and not as attorneys within the 
scope of an attorney-client relationship. They have not protections under the law. 
Hawley Troxell is directly interfering with Reed Taylor's contractual rights to 
control AlA Insurance, his right to be a member of the board of AlA Services, his rights 
to commissions and the $1.2 Million Mortgage collateral to which he is entitled to 
possess, and his rights to realize upon his collateral by and through its unauthorized 
representation and its representation of CropUSA. 
Hawley Troxell is also directly aiding and abetting John Taylor and other 
interested individuals in breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy, fraud and 
tortious interference. Significant damages to Reed Taylor are being caused by these 
actions, including impairing the value of AlA Insurance, the company that he is 
contractually entitled to control. In sum, the commission revenues of AlA Insurance and 
$1.2 Million Mortgage in which Reed Taylor has a direct security interest or a security 
interest by way of the property being proceeds of collateral securing his debt are being 
directly converted by John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, and others. 
Because Hawley Troxell has no authority to represent AlA Insurance, its 
assertions that it are merely rendering advice within the scope of an attorney-client 
relationship relative to AIA Insurance cannot be used as basis to assert that Reed Taylor's 
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At a minimum, the 
6 See Sections C-l and C-2 above. which are incorporated by reference into this section. 
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issues of whether Hawley Troxell has authority to represent AIA Insurance and whether 
Hawley Troxell has a legal privilege predicated upon an attorney-client relationship 
present factual issues which (it is respectfully submitted) cannot be decided by the Court 
0:0. an LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion, which is addressed solely to the sufficiency of the Reed 
Taylor's Complaint 
2. Hawley Troxell Has No Authority To Represent AlA Services Because 
It Was Never Retained By The Duly Authorized Representative Of 
AlA Services. 
Under the legal authority cited above, Hawley Troxell is not authorized to 
represent AIA Services and is, therefore, liable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. Reed Taylor and Donna 
Taylor are required to be members of the board of AIA Services. See Complaint, p. 16, 1 
37. Moreover, Hawley Troxell has unlawfully taken instructions and/or directives from 
the unauthorized board of AIA Services and without obtaining the necessary approvals. 
See Complaint, p. 20, 145. 
3. Because Of The Irreconcilable And Unwaivable Conflicts Of Interest, 
Hawley Troxell's Purported Representation Exceeds The Scope Of 
Representation. 
A consent to dual representation required by RPC 1.7 mandates that "the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who 
is to be represented, or by the shareholders." RPC l.13(g). Any conflict of interest in 
representing a majority shareholder and corporation in litigation brought by a minority 
shareholder was not waived, where only the majority shareholder approved the conflict 
waiver. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 2008). "[S]ome conflicts are 
nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such an 
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agreement or proyjde representation on the basis of the client's consent. When 
representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to 
each client." RPC 1.7, Comment 14. 
Reed Taylor would have been required to give any consent to represent AIA 
Insurance Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, andlor disinterested innocent shareholders 
would have similarly been required to provide consent for AlA Services. By undertaking 
to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests and by receiving and accepting 
directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their clients' conflicting 
interests, Hawley Troxell inevitably implicated itself in the claims for damages made by 
Reed Taylor. 
The basic allegations in Reed Taylor's Complaint encompass the following facts: 
It is claimed (and the court has found) that AlA Services is indebted to Reed Taylor by 
contract. The relationship between Reed Taylor and AlA Services is not merely creditor 
and debtor. AlA Services is insolvent and therefore owes fiduciary duties to its creditors 
under Idaho law (which means that AIA Semces should be operated exclusively for the 
benefit of creditors). Furthermore, the status of Reed Taylor is not a mere general 
creditor. Reed Taylor is a secured creditor (which is one of the most pertinent facts of 
this case relative to the liabilities for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual 
relationship and for conversion). Reed Taylor has a security interest in all of the stock of 
AIA Insurance and all of the commission revenue and related proceeds of AIA Insurance 
and AIA Services. Reed Taylor has the right to control AlA Insurance and has in fact 
voted the shares of AlA Insurance as he is contractually entitled to do. Furthermore, the 
Court has granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff finding AlA Services in default. 
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Reed Taylor has the right to control AlA Insurance and should be controlling AIA 
Insurance, but has been denied his contractual rights by the actions of John Taylor and 
the three corporations represented by Hawley Troxell, with the assistance of Hawley 
Troxell. 
Hawley Troxell currently represents CropUSA and AlA Services, and purportedly 
represents AIA Insurance as well. An interested director, John Taylor, who is a director 
common to AIA Services and CropUSA and purports to be a director of AlA Insurance, 
controls and makes the decisions for all the corporations with respect to litigation 
involving plaintiff and the corporations. John Taylor himself is a defendant in the 
litigation and is the object of claims of breach of fiduciary duties owed to the three 
corporations and to Reed Taylor, directly. Hawley Troxell receives and accepts litigation 
instructions from John Taylor. Each of Hawley Troxell's corporate clients has distinct 
and diverging interests based upon claims being litigated, diverging interests so strong 
that numerous torts such as fraud, fraudulent conveyance, conspiracy and conversion are 
implicated. John Taylor's interests are distinct and diverge from the interests of the 
corporations based upon claims being litigated. These distinct and diverging interests 
essentially result from: 1) the claim that AlA Services is iridebted to Reed Taylor by 
contract; 2) the claim that Reed Taylor is contractually entitled to control AIA Insurance 
and has contractual rights to full possession of the revenue commissions; 3) the claim that 
CropUSA is liable to AIA Services and AIA Insurance because of fraudulent 
conveyances, fraud and other torts; and 4) the claims that John Taylor is liable to AlA 
Services, AlA Insurance and CropUSA for breaches of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent 
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conveyance, excessive compensation and other torts. It is also claimed that John Taylor 
is liable to Reed Taylor because of breaches of fiduciary duties owed directly to him. 
The allegation against Hawley Troxell are for conspiracy and/or aiding and 
abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy; 
for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual relationships; and for conversion, and are 
underscored by the following facts: 
AIA Services, an insolvent corporation, should be operated exclusively for the 
benefit of creditors, specifically Reed Taylor. The interests of AIA Services are to 
maximize the recovery of assets for its creditors and pursue claims against others who 
may be liable the corporation. AIA Services should have separate counsel receiving and 
accepting instructions from independent directors. An attorney representing AIA 
Services should not be taking directions from an interested director like John Taylor 
against whom claims are being made. It is in the best interests of AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor. It is in the best interests of AlA Services 
and AIA Insurance to pursue claims against others, including CropUSA, which it is 
alleged is liable to AIA Services. Indeed, it is in the best interests of AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell. In addition, the interests of John 
Taylor and CropUSA are naturally adverse to the interests of AIA Services. It is 
inconceivable to expect John Taylor to manage his personal assets for the benefit of AIA 
Services and its creditors, Reed Taylor. It is inconceivable to expect CropUSA to be 
operated for the benefit of the creditors of AIA Services. It is impossible for attorneys, in 
this case Hawley Troxell, to purportedly represent the interests of AIA Services 
exclusively for the benefit the corporation and its creditors while at the same time 
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representing the interests of CropUSA and taking directions for both clients from an 
interested director like John Taylor. The interests are irreconcilable and ul1waivable and 
constitute Hawley Troxell's breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the corporations. 
In a situation such as described above, Hawley Troxell cannot avoid representing 
one client to the disadvantage of another client, i.e., the interests of one must necessarily 
predominate over the other. Hawley Troxell then must impermissibly divide its loyalty 
to a client and act outside the scope of an attorney-client relationship, and then shift its 
duty of loyalty back to itself to prevent claims from being asserted against it while 
maintaining a steady stream of ill-gotten income from the impossible and unlawful 
purported representations. 
4. Even IT Hawley Troxell Was Authorized To Represent AIA Services 
And AlA Insurance, Its Acts Are Outside Of The Scope Of 
Representation Because They Were Not In The Best Interests Of The 
Organizations. 
"[A]n attorney may not hide behind a client's instructions in order to perpetrate a 
fraud against a third party." The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1992). 
RPC 1. 13(b) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of 
the corporation: 
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other 
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act 
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation 
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely to result 
in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization ... 
RPC 1.13(b) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 
96 (2008) (virtually identical language to RPC 1.13(b)). 
Here, the only interests Hawley Troxell has served are those of itself, John Taylor 
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and other interested parties. With the assistance of Hawley Troxell, John Taylor and the 
other parties who should be on the receiving end of claims by AIA Services and AlA 
Insurance, are ensuring that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.are no longer being paid any 
amounts due them. Meanwhile, the funds continue to flow out of the corporations to 
CropUSA, John Taylor, Hawley Troxell and other interested and responsible parties. 
5. Any Purported Agreement For Hawley Troxell To Provide Legal 
Services Is Void And Unenforceable. 
Contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are unenforceable. 
Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 650 N.W.2d 364,370 (Mich. 2002). 
Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of 
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct 
or the law." RPC 1.16(a)(a). A lawyer may not engage in a representation that serves his 
or her.self interests and limits the representation of one or more clients. RPC 1.7(a)(2); 
see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 403 (C.A.D.C. 1996) (simultaneously 
representing multiple parties in violation of the rules of ethics constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
As a result of anyone or more of the ethical violations set forth above, Hawley 
Troxell is not truly authorized to represent any of the entities, let alone the person Hawley 
Troxell truly represents, John Taylor. Thus, Hawley Troxell cannot utilize the immunity 
defense for any of their acts and/or omissions and resulting torts. 
E. Assuming Hawley Troxell Is Authorized To Represent AlA Services And 
AlA Insurance, It Is Liable For An Claims Arising Out Of Actions 
Exceeding The Scope Of Its Purported Representation. 
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of their 
representation because the law does not provide absolute immunity. See Alpert v. Crain, 
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Caton & James P.e., 178 S.W. 3d 398 (Tex. 2005) (attorney liable for fraud committed 
outside the scope of representation); Kimmel v. Go land, 793 P.2d 524, 530 (Cal. 1990) 
(attorneys may be liable for aiding and abetting violation of privacy act or other illegal or 
tortious conduct). 
Hawley Troxell correctly notes that attorneys normally have the luxury of 
asserting litigation privilege. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 29-32. The only 
problem with Hawley Troxell's argument is that this is not the normal case. Hawley 
Troxell's primary argument is flawed and the same or similar flaws repeatedly appear 
throughout its Motion to Dismiss. Implicit in its analysis is the erroneous contention that 
the facts alleged by Reed Taylor are: 1) limited to the advice rendered by Hawley Troxell 
to a client; and 2) conceded to be performed within the scope of the attorney-client 
relationship. For example, in its Motion to Dismiss, Hawley Troxell refers to non-
liability for an attorney's "giving advice" (p. 7); to no liability where the attorney "did no 
more than provide legal advice" (pp. 8-9); to no liability for "merely by giving advice" 
(p. 15); and to non-liability for an attorney acting for the client within the scope of the 
attorney-client relationship (pp. 9,. 15 & 17). On pages 10-11 of Hawley Troxell's 
Motion, it advances the following summary conclusion: 
The plaintiff's claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting 
its clients' action relate only to advice rendered and positions taken in the 
course of zealous representation and, as such, must be dismissed for 
failure to state a cause of action. 
This bare conclusion of Hawley Troxell ignores the facts alleged in Reed Taylor's 
Complaint including all of the required inferences contained in the Complaint Reed 
Taylor's Complaint is plainly not limited to factual allegations pertaining to Hawley 
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Troxell merely giving legal advice to a client, but alleges acts committed by Hawley 
Troxell that are clearly outside the proper scope of an attorney-client relationship. 
Hawley Troxell understandably desires to "uncomplicate" this case by citation to 
case authorities involving cases with less complex and inapplicable facts (Le. cases where 
the sued attorney represents only one client and is not burdened by a conflict of interest 
because the attorney has undertaken to represent more than one client or when an 
attorney has not actually committed a tort). This case, however, is compounded because 
Hawley Troxell undertook to represent three corporate clients with each client having 
distinct and diverging interests, while 'taking instructions from John Taylor (a person not 
authorized to act on behalf of AIA Services and AlA Insurance). Furthermore, Hawley 
Troxell incorrectly received and accepted litigation instructions from interested (as 
opposed to independent) directors common to all three corporate clients. Moreover, the 
interested directors themselves should be the subject of pending claims of breach of 
fiduciary duties to the three corporate clients, but they are not because of the self interests 
of John Taylor, Hawley Troxell and the other responsible individuals. 
Hawley Troxell, while disregarding constant warnings from Reed Taylor's 
counsel, knowingly stepped into a situation complicated by irreconcilable conflicts of 
interest and fraught with individuals committing torts. As will be discussed below, an 
attorney with a conflict of interest goes outside the scope 'of an attorney-client 
relationship with respect to one client when the attorney acts for the benefit of another 
client and/or person to the detriment of the first client (assuming the attorney has 
authority to act). Likewise, the attorney provides more than mere legal advice when the 
attorney so acts. In summary, it is respectfully submitted that Hawley Troxell's 
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simplistic analysis of the causes of action asserted in Reed Taylor's Complaint should be 
evaluated by the Court in light of the pervasive conflicts of interest presented by the facts 
of this case which facts appear in Reed Taylor's Complaint. Reed Taylor is entitled to 
have all inferences from the facts considered in his favor. 
There are issues of fact pertaining to whether Hawiey Troxell had any authorized 
attorney-client relationship with AIA Insurance or AIA Services. At a minimum, there 
are issues of fact pertaining to the scope of Hawley Troxell's purported representation 
and the extent to which they exceeded any purported scope of representation. Moreover, 
Hawley Troxell has not, and cannot, provide any authority holding that a law firm's 
scope of representation of one client or more clients (AlA Insurance and/or AIA 
Services) includes defending another client (CropUSA) from claims that should be 
asserted by the other clients to recover millions of dollars that were fraudulently 
transferred with the law fum's assistance. In short, Hawley Troxell's acts and 
subsequent torts exceed any permissible scope of representation. 
F. Hawley Troxell Owes Reed Taylor Special Duties As A Secured Creditor, 
Stock Pledgee, And Creditor Of The Insolvent AlA Services. 
Under Idaho law, when a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in 
trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. See e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain 
Co., 98 Idaho 266, 651 P.2d 1299 (1977). Attorneys may not engage in legal 
representations that affect the attorney's responsibilities to third parties. RPC 1.7(a)(2) . 
. When a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors: 
[W]e hold that if an attorney represents both a dissolved or insolvent 
corporation and a director or officer of that firm, and if the attorney 
controls corporate assets, then the attorney must protect the financial 
rights of creditors to these assets, where he or she knows or should know 
that the director or officer intends to interfere with creditor's claims 
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through an improper distribution of these assets. 
Willner's Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399, 406 (Alaska 1994) (like the 
attorney in this action, Hawley Troxell was at one time in possession of the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage and funds derived from AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance). The lack of an 
attorney-client relationship does not preclude a finding of a fiduciary duty, which is an 
issue of fact for the jury. In re D.C. Equipment, Inc. v. Peshtigo National Bank, 112 B.R. 
855, 857 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that an issue of fact as to whether corporate 
debtor's counsel owed fiduciary duty to debtor's sole shareholder precluded summary 
judgment). 
Here, Reed Taylor holds a valid and perfected security interest in all of AlA 
Insurance and AIA Services' commissions and related receivables. Reed Taylor has a 
valid security interest in the shares of AlA Insurance. Reed Taylor is a creditor owed 
over $8,500,000 by the insolvent AIA Services, thereby making him the beneficiary of 
the funds and assets held in trust by AIA Services and its subsidiary AIA Insurance. 
Moreover, he is the pledgee of all of the shares in AlA Insurance and the only authorized 
director and officer. Meanwhile, Hawley Troxell is simultaneously representing the 
interests of John Taylor and others, with full knowledge of the insolvency of AlA 
Services and its trust fund obligations to Reed Taylor. There can be no better example of 
a situation in which corporate assets should be protected or better set of facts to support a 
lawyer's duties owed to a non-client. Thus, Reed Taylor's claims are all valid and 
warranted under the special factual circumstances of this case as he is the beneficiary and 
secured creditor Gfthe remaining assets and funds of the insolvent AlA Services. 
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G. Reed Taylor Has Pled Sufficient Facts To Support All Of His Causes Of 
Action. 
Without providing any specific examples and by citing cases that are either 
inapplicable (or that actually support Reed Taylor), Hawley Troxell asserts that Reed 
Taylor's Complaint is factually deficient and fails to plead facts sufficient to justify 
damages. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, p. 5. However, like Hawley Troxell's other 
arguments, the assertions are baseless and lack merit 
For example, Reed Taylor's Complaint specifically states "all applicable facts 
alleged below are incorporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to 
support each cause of action." See Complaint, p. 1. Thus, every fact alleged in Reed 
Taylor's Complaint applies as necessary to support each cause of action. As discussed in 
detail below, the facts and causes of action are all more than sufficiently pled. 
H. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled That Hawley Troxell Has Aided And 
Abetted In Various Torts. 
1. Contrary To Hawley Troxell's Argument, Idaho Has Numerous 
Aiding And Abetting Cases And Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled 
The Cause Of Action And They Are Not Barred By Any Privilege. 
Idaho has a plethora of cases on aiding and abetting. The following listed Idaho 
cases (in reverse chronological order) have clearly established the principles of law 
governing conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. In Todd v. Sullivan Canst. LLC, 
191 P.3d 196,203 (2008) (Idaho Report Cite Unavailable) (emphasis added), the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed aiding and abetting: 
As we stated in Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 682, 34 P.2d 957, 963 (1934): 
The law seems to be well settled that, where several people 
actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, not 
only the actual actor or assailant is liable but all others who aid, 
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abet, counselor encourage the wrongdoer by words, gestures, 
looks or signs are equally liable with him to the injured person. 
In Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 342, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). the 
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated: 
A person is subject to liability if he or she does a tortious act in concert 
with the other or pursuant to a common design with him. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 876( a) (1977). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has even addressed the minimal jury instructions necessary to 
fmd that a defendant aided and abetted: 
... the jury was instructed that: 
If you find that a defendant who did not personally perform a 
wrongful act nonetheless did pursue a common plan or design to 
commit that act with the actor by commanding, instigating, 
advising, aiding, abetting or encouraging the actor by words, 
gestures, looks or otherwise; then the conduct of the actor 
physically committing the wrongdoing was also the conduct of that 
defendant. If either is liable then both are equally liable. 
Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 348. In Price v. Aztec Ltd, Inc., 108 Idaho 674, 677-
78, 701 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeal addressed aiding and 
abetting: 
Secondly, it is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a 
contributing tort-feasor, joint tort-feasor or cotrespasser for harm resulting 
to a third person from the tortious conduct of another. Smith v. Thompson, 
103 Idaho 909,655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App.1982). See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69 
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39 
Idaho 354,227 P. 1055 (1924). Further, it has been held "all persons who 
command, instigate, encourage, advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or 
abet the commission of a trespass by another, are cotrespassers with the 
person committing the trespass .... " Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39 
Idaho at 358, 227 P. at 1056. 
When the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and indivisible harm, 
each contributing tort-feasor is liable to the same extent and in the same 
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves; i.e., they are 
jointly and severally liable. Smith v. Thompson, supra See generally 
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RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 875, 876 (1977); and cases 
collected at 74 AM.JUR.2d Torts § 66 (1974). Each tort-feasor is liable for 
the whole damage at the option of the injured party. Spencer v. Spencer, 
91 Idaho 880, 434 P.2d 98 (1967). The rule of joint and several liability 
also prevails where tort-feasors act in concert in the execution of the 
common purpose. The tort liability of persons acting in concert IS 
expressed in RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 876 (1979): 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability ifhe ... 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and 
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself, .... 
In the Restatement's comments on clause b it is said that if the 
encouragement or assistance referred to is a substantial factor in causing 
the resulting tort, then the one giving it is himself a tort-feasor and is 
responsible for the consequences of the other's act. 
In Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 911, 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho App.1982)., the Idaho 
Court of Appeals noted: 
It is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a contributing 
tortfeasor, joint tortfeasor, or "cotrespasser," for harm resulting to a third 
person from the tortious conduct of anather. See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69 
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho. Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho 
354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). "All persons who command, instigate, 
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid ar abet the commission 
af a trespass by anather are catrespassers with the person cammitting the 
trespass." Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho at 358,227 P. at 1056. 
Furthermore, when the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and 
indivisible harm, each contributing tartfeasor is liable to the same extent 
and in the same manner as if they had perfanned the wrangful act 
themselves; i.e., they are jointly and severally liable. See Lorang v. Hays, 
supra; Bailey v. Idaho lIT. Co., Ltd., supra; see generally Restatement 
(Secand) of Tarts §§ 875, 876 (1977); and cases collected at 74 AmJur.2d 
ToIiS§ 66 (1974). 
As noted in all of the Idaho cases cited above, Reed Taylar has sufficiently pled 
aiding and abetting causes of action against Hawley Troxell. For example, Reed Taylor 
specifically alleges the following in his Camplaint: 
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Defendants are liable to Reed 1. Taylor for an ammmt to be proven at trial 
because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided 
and abetted R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of 
fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches 
of fiduciary duties. 
See Complaint, p. 11, 1 27 (emphasis added). In Reed Taylor's Complaint, he also 
exhaustively pleads various forms of the cause of action of aiding and abetting, along 
with numerous facts. See Complaint, pp. 20-21, ,,46-50; see also e.g., Complaint, p. 4, 
,14; p. 5",15-16; p. 6,,17; pp. 6-7,,18; p. 7,119; p. 9,'23, pp. 10-11,,26; pp. 11-
12,'27; p. 12,,28; p. l3" 30, pp. 15-16,135; p. 16,137; p. 17, l' 38-39; p. 18,'41. 
All of the above facts are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's causes of 
action for aiding and abetting. See Complaint, pp. 1 and 20-21. Not only does Reed 
Taylor succinctly and specifically plead aiding and abetting, but he pleads the various 
causes of action with numerous fact patterns and claims. 
2. Hawley Troxell Is Liable For Aiding And Abetting In The CommiIdon 
Of Numerous Torts And Such Claims Are Not Barred By The 
Litigation Privilege. 
Like normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal 
theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy and other torts. Hearst v. Hearst, 50 
A.D. 3d 959 (N.Y. 2008) (factual issues precluded summary judgment on conversion and 
aiding and abetting of fraud claim against lawyer); In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 
(D. Colo. 2007); Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga App. 2003); Adena, Inc. v. 
Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (B.D.Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. NeUhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000); In re Atlantic Financial Management, Inc. Securities Litigation v. Paine 
Webber, Jackson & Cw·tis, et al., 658 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1986) (valid cause of 
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud based upon conflicts of interest). 
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A highly illustrative and demonstrative case is 111 re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 
2669150 (D. Colo. 2007). In that case, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy 
court's order granting a motion to dismiss. A bankruptcy trustee for the estate of a 
corporate debtor sued a law firm for tortious conduct involving certain fmancial 
transactions between the debtor and corporate insiders, mcluding one Howard Leach and 
"entities under his control," all referred to in the facts of the case as "Leach." The facts 
reveal a series of various transactions which are quite complex but ultimately involve 
Leach obtaIDing primary liens on debtor's assets when debtor was insolvent. The court 
notes that "of critical importance" to the trustee's claims is the fact that the law firm 
(referred to in the case as "ODC") acted as counsel for both debtor and Leach durmg the 
transactions which the court characterizes as "dual representation" attendant with 
conflicts of mterest and divided loyalties between the debtor and Leach. The district 
court stated: 
The bankruptcy court summarized the basis for Trustee's claims agaillst ODe as 
follows: 
[GDC], while owing professional duties to [Debtor] acted to 
protect the interests of another client, Leach, contrary to the 
interests of [Debtor]. Accordillg to [Trustee], [ODC] undertook to 
structure the Bridge Loans so that Leach, Blue Chip, and Akamai 
would receive security interests and/or payments from [Debtor] 
that were either fraudulent or preferential. 
In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 '" 3. The district court reviewed the allegations of 
the trustee's complaint relative to claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in the 
breach of fiduciary duties7 and held that the complaint stated claims. The court stated: 
7 The district court noted that "Colorado state law dictates that when a corporntion becomes insolvent, the 
corporation's creditors are owed a common law duty by the directors and officers of the corporation." 2007 
WL2669150 at * 14. 
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... I find Trustee sufficiently alleged the followmg claims on behalf of the 
corporation's creditors: (1) ODC engaged in a civil conspiracy with Leach, 
Blue Chip, Akamai, and members of Debtor's management to commit 
fraudulent transfers that breached fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors; 
and (2) ODC aided and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in 
breaching their fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors. Thus, I find the 
bankruptcy judge's determination that Trustee's allegation only supported 
. "claims of the debtor against a third party" was in error. [Footnote No.3] 
[Footnote No.3]. Strangely, another portion of the bankruptcy judge's 
opinion supports my finding here. The judge noted: "[T]he basis for all of 
[Trustee's] claims is that [Debtor] committed wrongful acts, i.e., violation 
of fiduciary duties it had to its creditors and shareholders or securities 
fraud, and that [Debtor] was either caused to commit such violations or 
was assisted in committing such violations by [ODC]." 
In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 * 9. 
The district court quotes the allegations of the trustee's complaint at length which 
allegations are pertinent and instructive for comparing to the allegations of the plaintiffs 
complaint in this case. The district court's opinion summarizes the claims and then 
provides quotations from the trustee's complaint: 
Claim three alleges that "[ODC] engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit 
fraudulent transfers in breach of its fiduciary duty by agreements with 
Leach, the Leach Trust, Blue Chip, Blue Chip's counsel, Akamai, 
members of [Debtor's] management including Roger Moody and Robert 
Ogden, and other Bridge lenders." ... Claim four alleges that GDC aided 
and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary 
duties by participating in or approving fraudulent transfers. 
[T]he followmg allegations [are] contained in [the] amended complaint: 
11 135 At all times after December 5, 2000, Blue Chip, Leach and 
[Debtor's] management were mown by [ODC] to have fiduciary 
duties to unsecured creditors of [Debtor] which prohibited self-
. dealing and preferences for insiders and required them to preserve 
the assets in trust for such creditors. 
11 137 Self-dealing insiders of [Debtor] including Blue Chip, 
Leach, [and] Ogden were unable to ratify or waive [GDC's] 
conflict which was undisclosed to other shareholders and general 
creditors. 
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11 143 GDC's fiduciary duties to [Debtor] encompassed duties 
which [Debtor] and its management owed to general creditors at all 
times after December 1, 2000 to avoid self-dealing and insider 
preferences. 
~ 155 The civil conspiracy in which [GDC] participated was 
attended by circumstances of fraud of willful and reckless 
disregard of the rights of [Debtor], unsecured creditors and smaller 
shareholders. 
~ 157 The officers and directors of [Debtor] breached their own 
fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors and/or smaller shareholders 
in [Debtor] by participating in or approving [GDes breach of 
fiduciary duties]. 
~ 160 GDC's conduct in aiding and abetting those breaches were 
attended by circumstances of fraud or willful and reckless 
disregard of the rights of the debtor, unsecured creditors. the 
Trustee and smaller shareholders. 
In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 * 9. 
In this' case, for the same reasons as in In re MS55. Inc., Reed Taylor's factual 
allegations against Hawley Troxell State claims upon which relief can be granted. 
Defendants, by undertaking to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests, and by 
receiving and accepting directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their 
other clients' conflicting interests, inevitably implicated themselves in the claims for 
damages made by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor properly states claims against Hawley 
Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in breaching 
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the 
......... detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other clients, AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance, and to the detriment of Reed Taylor directly. Reed Taylor's claims against 
defendants with respect to interference with his contractual relationships and conversion 
have the same foundation. 
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Another instructive case is Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (B.D. Pa. 
2001). In that case, a closely-held corporation and two shareholders sued a former 
majority shareholder ("Malecki') and his law finn ("Cohn") alleging among other claims 
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting in the breach offiduciary duty. The law 
firm moved to dismiss which motion was denied by the courl The facts indicate that 
Malecki, as corporate director and officer, diverted corporate funds to another business 
"which he owned and operated for his own personal pecuniary gain." In addition, 
Malecki used corporate "facilities and personnel to further" his other business. The law 
firm had undertaken to provide representation to both Malecki, personally, and the 
corporation and the facts of the case detail a number of personal and corporate 
transactions for which the law finn provided representation. The court stated the law 
firms' position on the applicable law as follows: "[T]he Cohn Defendants contend that .. 
. an attorney is not liable for aiding and abetting a corporate officers breach of fiduciary 
duty merely by the provision of advice to the corporation absent direct and knowing 
participation in the breach itself; ... " Adena, Inc., 162 F. Supp.2d at 356. The court 
addressed the issue, stated the law, and held as follows: 
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a 
plaintiff must show: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2) 
knowledge of the breach by the aider or abettor; and (3) substantial 
assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in effecting that 
breach. (Citations omitted). The court in Schuylkill Skyport Inn [v. llich, 
1996 WL 502280 (E.D.Pa.1996] did not require the direct and knowing 
participation that the Defendants contend is required. Rather, the court 
allowed the claim to proceed based upon a showing of "substantial 
assistance or encouragement" Moreover, even if such a heightened 
involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the Cohn 
Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's ' 
breach. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against the Cohn Defendants. 
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Adena, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d at 357-358. 
It would certainly appear from the preceding that Pennsylvania law is consistent 
with the law of Idaho as set forth in the cases cited above and follows the Second 
Restatement of Torts § 876 (which is followed by Idaho and is cited several times). It is 
to be emphasized that at the crux of the cause of action against the Cohn Defendants in 
Adena, Inc. v. Cohn was the dual representation of clients and the divided loyalties that 
inevitably occur. The Cohn Defendants subjected themselves to claims of liability for 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting of various torts by undertaking to represent more than 
one client and then substantially assisting the client in breaChing fiduciary duties owed to 
the other client 
Likewise, in this case Reed Taylor properly and sufficiently states claims against 
Hawley Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in 
breaching fiduciary duties by protecting John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the 
detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other purported clients, AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. 
Another illustrative case of divided loyalties, conflicts of interest and claims of 
aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty is Cacciola v. NeUhaus, 733 N.E.2d 
133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). That case arose out of a partnership of four brothers. The 
estate of one of the fraternal partners (Salvatore) filed suit against the partnership 
attorney. The partnership attorney had also undertaken to represent one of the three other 
brothers (Edward), individually, when Edward purchased the partnership share of another 
brother (Anthony). This transaction was alleged to have disadvantaged the partnership 
(which could have acquired Anthony's share for the partnership as a whole) to the 
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advantage of Edward, individually. The appellate court reversed the trial court's 
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint Citing the Second Restatement of Torts § 876, the 
court specifically addressed a cause of action against an attorney for aiding and abetting 
the breach of a fiduciary duty in a conflict of interest context: 
Indeed the defendant may also be liable for aiding and abetting Edward's 
breach of his fiduciary duty to Salvatore. As his partner, Edward owed 
Salvatore a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty," (citations omitted), 
the more so because of the familial relationship. (Citations omitted). 
<[L]iability arises when a person [actively] participates in a fiduciary'S 
breach of duty ... such that he .. , could not reasonably be held to have 
acted in good faith.' (Citation omitted). Compare Kurker v. Hill, 44 
Mass.App.Ct. 184, 189-190, 689 N.E.2d 833 (1998) (discussing 
Restatement [Second] of Torts § 876[b] [1977] and claim of civil 
conspiracy in context of rule 12[b][6] motion). Here, the plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant not only wrongly advised Edward he had no duty to 
Salvatore with regard to the purchase of Anthony's interest in the 
partnership, but acted as Edward's lawyer in a transaction that conflicted 
with his duty to the par1nership, and then refused to give Salvatore the 
information he requested after the sale had occurred. (Emphasis added). 
Cacciola, 733 N.E. 2d at 139 (emphasis added). 
To reiterate, in this case Reed Taylor's Complaint States claims against Hawley 
Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in breaching 
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the 
detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other purported clients, AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. Likewise, Reed Taylor's claims against 
Hawley Troxell with respect to interference with his contractual relationships and 
conversion have the same factual basis. 
3. The Cases Cited By Hawley Troxell Are Inapplicable Or 
Distinguishable. 
Hawley Troxell attempts to portray the facts in this case as though nothing 
abnormal has transpired. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 8-10. However, the cases 
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cited by Hawley Troxell either have little to no similarities with this case or are not 
properly cited at all. See e.g., Mann v. GTCR Golder Raztner, L.L.C., 351 B.R. 685 
CD.Ariz. 2006) (the law fIrm was not liable by way of its act of hiring a crisis manager for 
a corporation in good faith, who later misappropriated the corporation's assets without 
the assistance of the law fum); Durham v. Guest, 142 N.M. 817, 171 P.3d 756 (2007) 
(law firm following Allstate Insurance's internal protocol was not liable for aiding and 
abetting, since there were no allegations of wrongful acts by the law firm); Morin v. 
Trupin, 711 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (law frrm was not liable for stating its client's 
position); Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991) (attorney not liable for not 
disclosing facts to a minority shareholder because he did not knowingly assist in 
securities violations); Kahala Royal Corporation v. Goosill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 
Hawaii 251, 151 P.3d 732 (2007) (attorneys not liable for imposing unreasonable 
restrictions for reviewing documents). 
I. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Breach Of Fiduciary Duties And 
Aiding And Abetting Breach Of Fiduciary Duties. 
The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a lawyer 
for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties is the same as against any other 
person or entity. See e.g., In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007 
(8th Cir. 2007); Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. 
NeUhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). In addition, evidence that an attorney 
has. violated rules of ethics pertaining to dual representation is sufficient to support a 
claim that an attorney violated common-law fIduciary duty ofloyalty. Hendry v. Pelland, 
73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shareholder's allegations that a law firm's conflict of 
interest representing two corporations is sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary 
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duty against the law finn. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Serifl & Cohen LLC, 484 F. Supp.2d 
337 (B.D. Pa 2007). 
Reed Taylor's claims against Hawley Troxell include aidi;ng and abetting in John 
Taylor and other individuals' breaches of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, along 
with independent breaches of fiduciary duties personal to the corporations. See e.g., 
Complaint, pp. 7-8, 11,20-21, and 24-25. The claims in this matter are those personal to 
Reed Taylor and those inflicted upon AIA Services and AlA Insurance, for which Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring directly against Hawley Troxell in lieu of a derivative action. 
J. Reed Taylor Has Snfficiently Pled Conversion And Aiding And Abetting 
Conversion. 
1. Reed Taylor Has Pled Conversion As A Cause Of Action. 
When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has 
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g., 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 
P.2d 281 (et. App. 1983); Us. v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga 1969). The 
rights of a secured creditor are extensive: 
In some circumstances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition 
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most 
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral. the 
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the 
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an 
appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party 
may daim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, 
may only have one satisfaction .... 
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a 
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one 
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom 
property is transferred, or a third party who exercises dominion over the 
collateral or its proceeds ... 
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See 79 C.l.S. Secured Transactions § 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984); Lussier 
v. Mall Van Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804,814 (Hawaii App. 1983); Nelson v. Jones, 
38 Idaho 664, 224 P. 435,438 (1924); Western Fm'm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 
645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004) (when a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected 
security interest, the secured party may commence an action against the purchaser for 
conversion). 
Here, Reed Taylor has security interest in the commissions of AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor also has all of the shares of AIA Insurance pledged to him 
and holds a security interest in those shares. Moreover, Reed Taylor also has a security 
interest in the proceeds of all commissions and the distributions from AlA Services' other 
subsidiaries, namely, the $1.2 Million Mortgage improperly pledged to CropUSA. 
2. As A Secured Creditor, Reed Taylor Is Not Required To Own The 
Commissions And $1.2 Million Mortgage As They Are Pledged To 
Him As Collateral. 
One who wrongfully withholds personal property from another who is entitled to 
it under a security agreement may be liable for conversion. In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997, 
1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. App. 2004) ("A 
secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default, and so has 
sufficient possessory interest to bring a conversion action ... money can be the subject of 
conversion"); Western Farm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004). 
Reed Taylor has, since 1996, held a security interest in all of the commissions of 
AIA Services and AlA Insurance and the stock of AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4, , 
13; pp. 21-23",51-57. The $1.2 Million mortgage was also obtained as proceeds from 
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the same commissions and was unlawfully titled and pledged with the assistance of 
Hawley Troxell. See Complaint, p. 17-18, ~ 39. When AIA Services defaulted, Reed 
Taylor was entitled to possession of the collateral, namely the $1.2 Million Mortgage and 
all the commissions of AIA Services and AIA Insurance (which comprise virtually every 
dollar of their revenue, save the minimal amount of rent received from tenants of the 
building rented by AIA Insurance, which is also subject to Reed Taylor'S security interest 
in AlA Insurance's shares and his rightful control of the company). However, the 
property has not been relinquished to Reed Taylor as required, and hundreds of thousands 
of dollars have been wrongfully transferred to Hawley Troxell and others. 8 In other 
words, those amounts have been "converted" and Reed Taylor is rightfully seeking return 
of them. 
3. Hawley Troxell Has Asserted Wrongful Dominion Over Reed 
Taylor-'s Property. 
Under the same authority cited above, Hawley Troxell has taken and/or accepted 
funds from sources it knew were subject to a valid security interest in favor of Reed 
Taylor. Hawley Troxell mistakenly believes that the Idaho Code can strip away a valid 
and perfected security interest to pay attorneys fees to the very attorneys who have been 
assisting in perpetuating the fraud and corporate malfeasance over the years. See Hawley 
Troxell's Motion, pp. 19-20. However, the authority cited by Hawley Troxell has no 
application to Reed Taylor's valid and perfected security interests. 
4. Reed Taylor's Claimed Property Is Identifiable As A Specific Chattel. 
As set forth above, Reed Taylor has a security interest in virtually everything 
8 As indicated in Reed Taylor's Complaint, Hawley Troxell has been aiding and abetting John Taylor and 
others for years in the commission of various torts, including, fraudulent conveyances (e.g., $1.5 MiJ1ion to 
CropUSA), fraud, conspiracy, and other torts-aJI to benefit themselves, John Taylor and other responsible 
individuals, and all to the direct detriment of Reed Taylor. 
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ovmed by the corporations, all of wlllch are clearly identifiable by and through bank 
statements, money transfers, and loan proceeds (i.e., money laundering through the 
unlawful loan from CropUSA whereby Hawley Troxell assisted in the transaction and 
provided the purported legal services for all of the conflicting and diverging interests). 
K Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy And Aiding And Abetting 
Conspiracy. 
1. Hawley Troxell Has Engaged In Civil Conspiracy. 
Idaho law is well settled on claims for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading 
requirements. Argonaut Insurance Company v. White, 86 Idaho 374,379,386 P.2d 964 
(1963) ("In the instant case it is alleged that injury resulted from acts done in pursuance 
of the conspiracy" and the "order dismissing the complaint is reversed"); Lorang v. Hays, 
69 Idaho 440, 449, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) ("a concerted series of action on the part of 
wrongdoers, which culminates in producing the injury complained of ... pursuant to a 
conspiracy."); Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939) (an agreement 
becomes a conspiracy when its purpose is to do something that is unlawful or some 
lawful thing in an unlawful manner). 
Attorneys are also subject to liability for claims of civil conspiracy. See e.g., 
TraZ/b v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382, 387 (Ga App. 2003); Banco Popular North 
America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a 
conspiracy). In one treatise, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are distinguished: 
Civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of concerted-action 
liability. The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting is that a conspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a 
wrongful activity or to commit a tortious act, while aiding and abetting 
focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gives' substantial assistance' to 
someone who performs wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant 
agrees to join the wrongful conduct. 
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See 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 3 (2008) (emphasis added). 
Like aiding and abetting. Hawley Troxell attempts to confuse Reed Taylor's 
conspiracy claim by citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions. However. as 
discussed above. Idaho law is well settled on conspiracy claims. Reed Taylor's 
Complaint alleges causes of action against Hawley Troxell for conspiracy, which are both 
personal to Reed Taylor and which he is pursuing in place of the corporations for his 
benefit. The agreement Hawley Troxell entered into involves the alleged "Joint Defense 
Agreement," "Joint Retainer Agreement" and their purported direct and indirect improper 
representation of John Taylor and other individuals for the purpose of interfering with 
Reed Taylor's contractual rights and unlawfully protecting the interests of John Taylor, 
thereby preventing claims from being asserted against Hawley Troxell and covering up 
years .of inappropriate representation and opinion letters. Moreover, the conspiracy 
involves 'covering up and perpetuating fraud, conversion, and other claims, as set forth in 
Reed Taylor'S Complaint See e.g., Complaint, pp. 7-8 n 19-20; p. 21 n 47-49. 
Similarly, while practicing law is generally a lawful activity, practicing law 
becomes illegal when done so in an illegal manner, as set forth in Reed Taylor's 
Complaint. ThuS, although entering into a joint defense agreement is generally 
permissible, the same joint defense agreement can also be improperly used to illegally or 
unlawfully practice law. 
2. Contrary To Hawley Troxell's Assertions, Reed Taylor Has 
Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy. 
Hawley Troxell challenges Reed Taylor'S conspiracy claim on various theories. 1 
relating to an attorney being protected by merely giving advice to a client. See Hawley 
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Troxell's Motion pp. 14-15. As with Hawley Troxell's other arguments, the authority it 
relies upon deals with traditional cases with facts and legal issues significantly 
distinguishable. However, as discussed above, Hawley Troxell's acts do not merely 
involve providing legal advice. Indeed, Hawley Troxell was not, and is not, authorized to 
represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance, and all of its acts are actionable. 
Notwithstanding this fact, Hawley Troxell has exceeded any purported scope of 
representation and engaged in conspiring with John Taylor, CropUSA and others to 
commit various torts and retain property in which Reed Taylor holds a valid and 
perfected security interest. 9 
L. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Tortious Interference And Aiding And 
Abetting Tortious Interference. 
1. Reed Taylor Has Pled Tortious Interference With A Contract. 
A prima facie case of the tort [of interfering with a contract] is established where 
the plaintiff adduces proof of the following elements: 
(a) Existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the 
defendant, ( c) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and 
(d) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1028, 772 P.2d 228 (1988). Reed Taylor concedes 
that the above elements are required to make a prima facie case for tortious interference 
with a contract They are not required to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to LR.C.P. 
12(b)(6). Nevertheless, Reed Taylor has one again sufficiently pled the cause of action, 
contrary to Hawley Troxell's assertions. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 15-17. As 
with all of Reed Taylor's causes of action, he incorporates by reference each fact in the 
9 Surprisingly, Hawley Troxell even admits that it assisted in the improper titling and pledging of the $1.5 
Million Mortgage to CropUSA-the same mortgage that was acquired with funds in which Reed Taylor 
had a security interest and the estate of The Universe, another subsidiary of AlA Services whose shares and 
all distributions thereto were pledged to Reed Taylor. See Hawley TroxelJ's Answer, p. 8,139. 
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Complaint necessary to support each cause of action. See Complaint, p. 1. 
With respect to the first and second elements, Reed Taylor pleads the existence of 
contracts. See e.g., Complaint, p. 3, 11 11-12; p. 4, 1'13-14; p. 17,138; p. 21, 'lI 48. 
Surprisingly,. Hawley Troxell even admits to baving knowledge of Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement 10 See Hawley Troxelrs Answer, p. 4, ,. 13. Thus, the first and second 
elements are not only pled, but satisfied for purposes of the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement With respect to the third element, Reed Taylor bas also specifically pled 
intentionally interferences. See e.g., Complaint, p. 4, .. 14; p. 5, .. 15; p. 9, 'lI 23; p. 16, 'II 
37; p. 17; .. 38; p. 21, 'II 48. Finally, Reed Taylor bas pled the final element of damages. 
See e.g., Complaint, p. 17, , 38; p.11, 127(1); p. 12, '128; pp. 25-26. Thus, Reed Taylor 
bas pled all four elements of tortious interference with a contract (as to him and the 
corporations). 
2. Hawley' Troxen Has Tortiously Interfered With Reed Taylor's 
Contractual Rights By And Through Its Purported Representation 
And Improper Assistance Of John Taylor And CropUSA. 
Employees and agents are third-parties when acting outside of their scope of 
authority. See e.g., Houser v. City of Redmond, 91 Wn.2d 36,586 P.2d 482, 484 (Wa. 
1978). As the purported (and unauthorized) agent for CropUSA, AIA Services and AlA 
Insurance, Hawley Troxell has tortiously interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights 
with AlA Services and AIA Insurance by exceeding all scope of representation and 
without proper authorization. By representing CropUSA (and John Taylor), Hawley 
Troxell has intentionally interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights. Moreover, 
Hawley Troxell has also intentionally interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights . 
10 Hawley Troxell does not admit to baving knowledge of the $6M Note. Restructure Agreement, Amended 
Security Agreement or any other agreements. 
PLAlNTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 49 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
through its unauthorized representation of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. Finally, and 
not exhaustively, Hawley Troxell has interfered with Reed Taylor's rights to be a board 
member of AlA Services, interfered with his rights to possession of commission 
collateral, and interfered with his rights involving the $1.2 Million Mortgage, among 
various others. In sum, Hawley Troxell is essentially unlawfully and inappropriately only 
representing John Taylor and his constituents. 
M. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Fraud And Aiding And Abetting 
Fraud. 
Generally, a plaintiff must plead the following nine elements in order to state a 
claim for fraud: 
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that 
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 
(7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that 
misrepresentations and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded 
summary judgment in buyer's action for fraud). II 
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an 
alternative cause of action to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not 
require a plaintiff to plead the nine elements of cornmon law "fraud." See e.g., Smith v. 
Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 
Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative 
cause of action to fraud and that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine 
elements of fraud "is not the case"); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61, 415 P.2d 698 
11 The causes of action in Reed Taylor's Complaint are based upon constructive fraud. However, Reed 
Taylor will also plead traditional frauds claims in hls Amended Complaint for other specific act, including 
those that have occurred since Reed Taylor :filed hls initial Complaint. 
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when the builder failed to do so). 
Moreover, a cause of action under "constructive fraud" is ruscussed in significant 
detail in numerous treatises (which are frequently followed and cited by the Idaho 
Supreme Court): 
Constructive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, 
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate 
confidence, or to injure public interests. 
Constructive fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct, 
which if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It 
is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt 
of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to 
deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public 
interests. The legal duty may arise from a statute, a contract, or a trust. 
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of fraud. 
Neither actual rushonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential 
element. Thus, a party whose actions constitute constructive fraud might 
still have acted in good faith ... 
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 5 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to 
positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the court because of its 
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, 
even though the act is not done or omitted with an actual design to 
perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated, 
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of conduct 
which, if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage, 
irrespective of the existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud. 
Constructive fraud, sometimes called legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud, 
although it rests upon presumption and rests less upon furtive intent than 
does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed from the relation of the parties 
to a transaction or from the circumstances under which it takes place. 
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the 
other to his or her prejUdice. 
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said 
that constructive fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It 
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requires neither actual dishonesty nor intent to deceive. being a breach of 
legal or equitable duty that. irrespective of the moral guilt of the 
wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive 
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence. 
In its generic sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and 
concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or 
confidence that results in damage to another. Hence, the terms 
"constructive fraud" and «legal fraud" both connote that in certain 
circumstances one may be charged with the consequences of his words 
and acts as though he has spoken or acted fraudulently, although, properly 
speaking, his conduct does not merit this opprobrium. 
If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive" 
and "legal" as applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a 
fiduciary relationship or of a contract uberrimae fidei is usually called 
"constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal fraud" is generally used to 
characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of its falsity. 
Constructive fraud may result from reckless and heedless representations, 
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive. 
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, attorneys are liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud. 
See Hearst v. Hearst, 50 AD. 3d 959, 857 N.Y.S. 596 (N.Y. 2008). 
Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor and others in the commission of fraud, 
including constructive fraud, which simply requires a duty and funds being 
inappropriately diverted or utilized. Reed Taylor has sufficiently pled these claims. 
N. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Claims For Malpractice. 
For all of the reasons identified in this Response, Reed Taylor has standing to 
pursue any beneficiary claims and direct claims against Hawley Troxell for malpractice 
claims owned by AlA Insurance and AlA Services. 12 Nevertheless, Hawley Troxell cites 
12 Reed Taylor concedes that his independent malpractice claims asserted against Hawley Troxell are thinly 
supported by the third-party beneficiary and related authority cited above. However, the undersigned was 
also unable to find a single case in which a creditor was owed millions of dollars by a highly insolvent 
corporation, a creditor had a security interest in funds being converted and improperly utilized by the 
defendant law fum, and the other significant facts in this case. That being said, Reed Taylor is still entitled 
to bring direct claims against Hawley Troxell in lieu of derivative claims as be is the only person entitled to 
receive any damages from the numerous harms. 
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significant authority on malpractice claims and the requirement for privity. See Hawley 
Troxell's Motion, p. 23-27. Reed Taylor concedes that any claims against Hawley 
Troxell for malpractice arising from its purported representation of AIA Services would 
only be warranted by way of the extreme facts in this case (facts not seen in other cases). 
However, this is not true with AIA Insurance because of Reed Taylor's special standing 
as a pledgee, director, officer and secured creditor of AIA Insurance's shares and assets. 
o. Reed Taylor Has Alleged Valid Claims Under The Unfair Trade 
Practices Act. 
Hawley Troxell moves to dismiss Reed Taylor's claim as if the incredible facts 
supporting the claims alleged by Reed Taylor did not exist. See Hawley Troxell's 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 21-23. However, like Hawley Troxell's other arguments, Reed 
Taylor has alleged valid claims and the facts to support such claims.13 
1. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid Claim Against Hawley Troxell For 
Unfair Trade Practices. 
Courts do not afford attorneys blanket immunity from claims brought by opposing 
parties under the unfair trade practices acts. See e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 
288 Conn. 69, 95-96, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008); Burns ex reI Office of Public 
Guardian v. Hale and Dorr LLP, 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.Ct. Mass. 2006) (allegations by a 
guardian for disabled minor against law fum and trust manager demonstrated 
recklessness necessary to establish claim under unfair trade act); St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 
F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Ct. N.M. 2000) (attorney's misleading conduct violated unfair 
practices act); see also Burnap v. Linnartz, 38 S.W.3d 612, 619-20. In Chapman 
13 Hawley Troxell's arguments only pertain to the issue of contractual privity. Legal representation does 
not necessarily involve a contract 
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Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008) citing Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 
Conn. 490, 529 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1987) (other internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a debtor's attorney 
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act: 
[TJhis court's refusal to permit litigants to raise claims against opposing 
counsel under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act cannot be 
construed, as the defendant suggests, as affording blanket immunity to 
attorneys for tortious acts they commit against third parties while 
representing clients. Rather, the evidence shows that the defendant 
negotiated, and directed his client to execute, a note and mortgage relating 
to property that the defendant knew the client did not own ... 
Here, Reed Taylor's cause of action survives as an exception to the general rule 
that a contract is necessary. The facts in this case are far more extreme than any of the 
cases cited above and are easily distinguished from any cases cited by Hawley Troxell. 
2. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid Direct Claim For UDlair Trade 
Practices Against Hawley Troxell 
Under the same legal authority and argument above and Idaho's Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring claims directly against Hawley Troxell for 
its violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act involving its purported representation of 
AIA Insurance and AIA Services, i.e., Reed Taylor should be permitted to bring AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance's claims directly against Hawley Troxell by way of being a 
stock pledgee, secured creditor, creditor of an insolvent corporation, the only authorized 
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and the only person/creditor entitled to any 
recovered damages. All of the actions taken by Hawley Troxell have directly damaged 
Reed Taylor in a distinct and special manner. None of Hawley Troxell's actions were 
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authorized. Moreover, Reed Taylor's direct claims will prevent duplicative litigation and 
there are no other bona-fide parties entitled to the assets or claims of the companies.14 
P. Although Reed Taylor's Complaint States Valid Causes Of Action, He 
Requests Leave To File An Amended Complaint To Clarify Facts And 
Causes Of Action. 
The twin purposes behind the court rule governing amendments to pleadings are 
to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technica1iti~s, and to make 
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the 
facts at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P 2d 1197 
(1999). If a complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action, a refusal to grant permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a 
substantial right Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 135, 326 P.2d 994 (1958). 
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. Christensen Family Trust v. 
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) Citing Dzdfin v. Idaho 
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P2d 1195, 1206 (1995) (emphasis 
added). "Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in 
furtherance of justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 348 
(1960). 
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support all of his causes 
of action against Hawley Troxell. Nevertheless, Reed Taylor requests leave to file an 
amended complaint to clarify facts and causes of action against Hawley Troxell, cure any 
14 In the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover sufficient funds and assets to satisfy his 
$9,000,000 debt, he will ensure that any other funds are first paid to Donna Taylor, the priority shareholder. 
and deposit the remaining funds in the Court's registry for other innocent shareholders. 
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alleged deficiencies, and add additional causes of action and facts. IS 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Hawley Troxell's Motion to Dismiss should be 
denied in full. Iv! 
DATED tbi~ day of October, 2008. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KlRBY PLLC 
Data\I3lS\J322\n:sporu1c.m1n dismiss.FlNAL.doc 
15 A motion to amend and supplement complaint will be filed before the hearing and a draft version of the 
proposed amended complaint will be filed at that time. The amended complaint will clarify facts, clarify 
and add causes of action, and include additional facts ascertained since the Complaint was filed 
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7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRlCK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend 
and Supplement his Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A 
I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON 
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion. the attached Exhibit 
A, and the Court's fIle. 
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ll. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires ... " LRC.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to 
supplement a "pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have 
happened since the date of the pJeading sough to be supplemented ... " I.R.C.P. 15(d). 
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of 
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960). 
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend his Complaint in the form 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of the amendment is to: (1) clarify and 
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims. 
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint. 
DATED this lC'ty of October, 2008. 
Daml13 J5\J322lmtn.nmcnd complninldoc 
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is 
bringing this action on behalf of himself and 
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders 




GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Hawley Troxell. 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
~TAMENDEDCO~~FOR 
DAMAGES 
JURy TRIAL DEMANDED 
I. FACTS 
1. Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, 
BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below 
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy and/or requested relief to 
EXHIBIT 
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the extent neceSSlli'l' to support each such cause of action, remedy and/or requested 
relief): 
2. Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. Reed Taylor is bringing this action on behalf of himself individually and on 
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of AlA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") 
and AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance"). Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined 
in I.C. § 48-608. 
3. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley TroxeU") is an Idaho 
limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is 
Yicariously liable for the acts of the indiYidual Hawley Troxell. Hawley Troxell has 
purportedly acted as counsel for AIA Services, AlA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA"). 
4. Defendant Gary D. Babbitt ("Babbitt") is an individual residing in the 
state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley 
Troxell. 
5. Defendant D. John Ashby ("Ashby") is an individual residin~ in the state 
of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley 
Troxell. 
6. Defendant Patrick V. Collins ("Collins") is an individual residing in the 
state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley 
TroxelL 
7. Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") is an individual residing in the state 
ofIdabo and is an attorney in the state ofIdaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
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8. Jane Does IwX are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that 
participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known Hawley 
Troxell with and for Hawley Troxell who are also responsible for the claims and 
damages. (All of the Defendants are collectively referred to as "Hawley Troxell" or "its" 
or "Defendants"). 
9. Hawley Troxell transacted business through the practice of law in Nez 
Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. Hawley Troxell committed tortious acts, exceeded the scope of any 
purported representation, andior assisted in the commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. Hawley Troxell's tortious acts andlor assistance have inflicted damages 
upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
10. Damages in this action exceed $10,000. Jurisdiction and venue are, 
therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. To the extent that there are any 
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as 
alternative relief, claims, remedies and damages being sought against Hawley Troxell 
(i.e., if Hawley Troxell had authority to represent AlA Services or AIA Insurance, then it 
still committed certain torts and breached duties). However, no allegations in this 
Complaint should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the 
corporations that Hawley Troxell ever bad authority to represent AIA Services or AlA 
Insurance. 
11. AIA Services is a closely held Idaho corporation. AIA Insurance is a 
ciosely held Idaho corporation. The present purported officers and directors of AIA 
Insurance and AIA Services (R. John Taylor "John Taylor", Connie Taylor, James Beck, 
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IoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman) are interested parties by way of their tortious acts and 
ownership of shares in CropUSA. Thus, a direct action for certain claims is appropriate 
because, among other reasons set forth in this Complaint, any funds recovered should not 
be placed in the hands of the foregoing parties. 
12. AIA Services has pledged all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance 
that it owns to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 Million Promissory Note dated August I, 
1995, the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended and Restated 
Security Agreement, the Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement (all of the foregoing, ancillary documents and related documents 
are collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agreements"). 
13. At all relevant times of the transactions and causes of action set forth in 
this Complaint, Reed Taylor was the sole pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's outstanding 
shares and the only secured creditors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance entitled to the 
commissions and related receivables received by the corporations and all proceeds related 
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the sole stock pledgee of AlA Insurance's shares, Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct claims as a shareholder since a pledgee 
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a shareholder, in addition to the individual 
rights to protect coUateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered 
from all direct and derivative causes of action. 
14. As a creditor of the insolvent AIA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a 
secured creditor of the insolvent AlA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative 
andlor direct claims against responsible parties in the place of, or on behalf of, AlA 
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Services. Reed Taylor is the only person entitled to the recovery of funds, damages, and 
the like because of being (a) the only creditor with a security interest in AlA Insurance; 
(b) the only creditor with a security interest in all past, present and future commissions 
and related receivables of AlA Services and AIA Insurance; (c) the only creditor with a 
security interest in all of the shares of AIA Services' subsidiaries and all dividends and 
distributions related to such shares, including, without limitation the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage received from the estate of The Universe; (d) a long standing creditor with 
substantial contractual rights, which such rights and amounts owed to Reed Taylor were 
specifically detailed in the financial statements of AIA Services since 1995, thereby 
placing other creditors on notice of his superior claims; (e) the only person with priority 
over all assets, funds and claims of AlA Services by way of the Subordination Agreement 
with Donna Taylor; and (f) the creditor who is owed over $8,500,000. 
15. To the extent that any bona-fide creditor or shareholders come forward 
with any interests superior to Reed Taylor or to the extent that any dispute may arise 
between Reed Taylor and other creditors, Reed Taylor will, without waiving any legal 
rights or remedies as a pledgee, creditor and secured creditor, either (a) pay the 
creditor(s) in his sole discretion; (b) seek a determination under the law of the priority or 
rights to any payments or funds; (c) deposit the subject funds andlor property with the 
Court for a determination of priority or rightful possession pursuant to an interpleader 
action; or (d) take such other reasonable actions as necessary under the law. 
16. Although Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
Connie Taylor and James Beck are inappropriately and fraudulently asserting that Reed 
Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal (which Reed Taylor 
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denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid the causes of 
action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against them for misappropriating 
the assets, funds, services and opportunities of AlA Service andior AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor will move the Court to deposit all funds and property recovered from Hawley 
Troxell until the illegality issue has either been withdrawn, voluntarily dismissed, or a 
determination has been made by the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. The evidence 
will show that the redemption was not illegal and that Hawley Troxell and the other 
parties (including John Taylor and JoLee Dudos' alleged intervention) are simply 
attempting to find any way to delay andior thwart Reed Taylor'S valid rights and causes 
of action, and fraudulently avoid all of their unlawful acts and years of misappropriation 
of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance's assets, funds, services andior opportunities. 
17. AIA Services' financial condition far exceeds the "zone of insolvency" as 
Reed Taylor is owed over $9,000,000 and the present fair-market value of AIA Services' 
assets are $6,000,000, less than the amount owed Reed Taylor. But for the unlawful 
actions of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, 
Bryan Freeman and other parties to protect their own interests, AIA Services should be in 
bankruptcy under close scrutiny of a trustee. Hawley Troxell has :fuJI knowledge of 
intimate details of the inappropriate andlor unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of ALA 
Services andior AIA Insurance's assets, funds and services to Crop USA, John Taylor and 
other parties. 
18. On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor served a derivative 
demand letter upon the purported board of directors of AlA Services and AIA Insurance 
to take various actions, including specified actions against Hawley Troxell. John Taylor, 
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Michael Cashman, James Beck and all responsible parties for various tortious acts and 
the recovery of misappropriated assets, funds, services and/or compensation. Reed 
Taylor has also made other written demands upon the purported boards of AlA Services 
and AIA Insurance to take action. and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor has also 
made substantial non-frivolous claims against the responsible parties in Taylor v. AM 
Services, et al., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations. 
However, the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to act and 
have failed to conduct the corporations in a responsible manner consistent with the law. 
19. The purported relevant past and present board members and officers of 
AlA Insurance and AIA Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to 
properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, and have continued to do so 
even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell. The 
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the 
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, opportunities, 
services and claims which should be pursued. 
20. Because of the fact that the relevant past and present purported board 
members of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have a vested interest in not pursing claims 
against themselves or the attorneys that have unlawfully assisted them and have utterly 
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be 
the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by 
the parties currently purported to manage AIA Services and AIA Insurance. This action 
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the state of Idaho which it would 
otherwise not have. 
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21. Although Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA 
Insurance and that the actions of AIA Services' board of directors is not authorized, Reed 
Taylor is pursuing claims under this Complaint as though the directors were not 
authorized to act and, to the extent that the boards were authorized, then the actions were 
unlawful, inappropriate and exceeded the scope of any agency act on behalf of AlA 
Services and AIA Insurance. 
22. Hawley Troxell's acts, omissions, and torts alleged in this Complaint 
exceed any purported attorney-client relationship and are not protected by any litigition 
privilege or immunities. Hawley Troxell's purported legal representation was never 
authorized by the proper boards of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. Any purported 
waivers Hawley Troxell has obtained were not received by authorized andlor 
disinterested representatives of AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and were not 
authorized. 
23. To the extent that Hawley Troxell obtained any waivers or consents, its 
purported legal representation exceeded the scope of any representation that was in the 
best interests of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor andlor James Beck, Hawley Troxell knew that any purported 
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AIA Services or AlA 
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported representation. 
24. AlA Services and AIA Insurance's purported agents, boards andlor 
officers, in which Hawley Troxell allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all proper 
acts as agents, board members and officers of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, which 
further resulted in Hawley Troxell's acts exceeding the scope of any authorized legal 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 8 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
andlor attorney-client representation. AU of the actions of Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor and James Beck were outside of the scope of their authorized acts and 
duties. 
25. Reed Taylor's Complaint is comprised of three types of claims: (a) those 
claims and damages personal and individual to Reed Taylor; (b) those claims and 
damages that are personal to Reed Taylor and AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance, but 
which are being brought by Reed Taylor directly against Hawley Troxell; and (c) those 
claims that are owned only by AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but which are being 
prosecuted by Reed Taylor derivatively on behalf of AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance. 
26. In addition, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively 
being prosecuted on behalf of AIA Insurance directly on behalf of AIA Insurance should 
he gain control of the company in the near future. To the extent that funds and/or 
property is recovered that exceed the amounts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such 
funds andlor property with the Court for the distribution to innocent shareholders of AIA 
Services. 
27. Hawley Troxell is not, and has never been, authorized to represent AIA 
Insurance or AIA Services in Taylor v. AlA Services, et af. Hawley Troxell is not, and 
has not, represented the interests of AIA Insurance or AIA Services, but instead has 
represented the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, 
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties. 
28. As the only authorized officer and board member of AIA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor, has Dot and will not authorize or consent to Hawley Troxell as being attorneys for 
AIA Insurance or representing the company in any fashion. As a person who is required 
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to be a member of the board of AIA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize 
Hawley Troxell to represent AIA Services. Thus, Hawley Troxell has no scope of 
representation because it is unlawfully representing AIA Services and AlA Insurance. 
29. Reed Taylor is the pledgee of aU of the shares of AlA Insurance, the only 
shareholder of AIA Insurance by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, the only 
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of 
AIA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AlA Services is insolvent). 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over 
$8,500,000, plus interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed Taylor. Therefore, 
Reed Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against Hawley Troxell for certain 
damages. 
30. At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AIA 
Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Reed Taylor is presently 
owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services. At all material times, Hawley Troxell had :full 
knowledge of AJA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor. 
31. AlA Services defaulted on the terms of the $6.000,000 promissory note 
when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a 
formal demand was unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on 
August 1, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AIA Services by Reed 
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Riley at 
the law firm of Eberle Berlin pursuant to the notice provisions of the Redemption 
Agreements. AIA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent 
from said date. 
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32. Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AIA Services, 
Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AIA 
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Insurance and AlA 
Services. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1, 
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of AIA Services to vote the 
stock of AIA Insurance, and take operational control of AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor's 
right to vote the stock of AlA Insurance was also perfected through AIA Services' 
irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor that was coupled with an interest as 
required by I.C § 30-1-722. 
33. On February 22,2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance and 
attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided under the 
law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested directors of 
AlA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Hawley Troxell intentionally 
assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
and refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AIA Insurance and 
refused to surrender control as required. 
34. Hawley Troxell further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting 
interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining 
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Hawley Troxell knew there 
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and 
tortious interference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and funds 
of AlA Insurance were being misappropriated andlor not safeguarded. 
35. Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services, AIA 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 11 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
71t7 
Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, 
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez 
Perce County Case No. CV -07-00208 ("Taylor v. AM Services, et af. "), and therein Reed 
Taylor obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AlA Services' default of the 
$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote 
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance but for 
the actions of John Taylor, which Hawley Troxell, with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's 
rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AlA Services, AIA Insurance 
and Reed Taylor. 
36. With Hawley Troxell's full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims asserted in 
Taylor v. AlA Services, et aT. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, 
fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including 
CropUSA), including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongfully 
transferred over $1,500,000 of AlA Insurance's cash to CropUSA, for no consideration 
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AIA Insurance to CropUSA 
for no consideration. John Taylor was at all times material also an interested director, 
officer and. shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims 
that John Taylor and others had engaged in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions 
with AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed 
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including 
CropUSA). 
1/1 
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37. In 2007, Hawley Troxell appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AIA 
Services, et aI., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AlA Services, a 
corporation, and AlA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of Jo1m 
Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and Michael Cashman). At all material times Jo1m Taylor was an interested purported 
CEO and director of AIA Services and AlA Insurance and an interested majority 
shareholder of AlA Services. The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil 
conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated by John Taylor and 
others against AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and such acts having damaged and 
continuing to cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In 
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Hawley 
Troxell undertook to represent the three named clients AIA Services, AlA Insurance, and 
CropUSA, which such entities had no true cornman interests and each having 
irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other. 
38. In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Hawley Troxell that it was 
not appropriate for Hawley Troxell to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, andlor 
to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact 
that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims against him. Despite the 
warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's attorney, Hawley Troxell also appeared 
and represented Crop USA, which created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a 
breach of Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AIA 
Services and AlA Insurance, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and their duty of care. 
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39. Hawley Troxell inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint 
Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA Insurance, 
Inc., J olm Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in Taylor v. AIA Services, et 
al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Ru1es of 
Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services, AIA Insurance 
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., a Joint Defense Agreement was not 
permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and 
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent 
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement 
was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint 
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. 
40. The Joint Defense Agreement(s) facilitated by Hawley Troxell has 
assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman 
and CropUSA) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, while also assisting Hawley 
Troxell in inappropriately and unlawfully obtaining payment of fees and costs for its 
services and in violation of the Ru1es of Professional Conduct and Hawley Troxell's duty 
of care. 
41. Hawley Troxell assisted AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, John 
Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions 
which were in violation of the Rilles of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, were 
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, 
constituted fraud and/or the inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to AIA 
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Services andior AlA Insurance, were not arms-length transactions, andior were done so 
without requiring AIA Services, AIA Insurance andior CropUSA to retain separate 
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested parties. 
42. As the purported attorneys for AlA Services, an entity, Hawley Troxell 
owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and 
under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets 
and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services was insolvent, to its creditors 
including Reed Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services, and in light of the claims made 
against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its entity 
client not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually andlor 
through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties. 
43. As the purported attorneys for AIA Insurance, an entity, Hawley Troxell 
owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care and 
the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the 
corporation's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and assume 
control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but whose 
rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in control 
of the corporation including John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance and in light of 
the claims made against John Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell 
owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of John 
Taylor, individually andlor through any Joint Defense Agreement, andlor of other 
interested parties (including CropUSA, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael 
Cashman). 
FIRST AlvIENDED COMPLAINT -15 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
793/ 
44. As attorneys representing the interests of John Taylor through a Joint 
Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell owed its duties first and foremost to its purported 
clients AlA Services and AlA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, duty of care andlor the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking 
directions andlor accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and 
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by 
the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to 
assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested 
parties. Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or 
approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell's duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of 
Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor. 
45. As the purported attorneys for AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance 
(individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) Hawley Troxell owed duties of 
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor or CropUSA in Taylor v. 
AM Services, et al.. or represent or assist John Taylor in Danna J. Taylor v. R. John 
Taylor because Hawley Troxell's loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services andlor 
AlA Insurance. Furthermore, Hawley Troxell could in no way represent CropUSA or 
participate in any joint defense of Crop USA or other interested parties (such as John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AIA Services andlor 
AlA Insurance should have been asserting claims against CropUSA, each other, and other 
interested and uninterested parties. 
46. Hawley Troxell represented, and continue to represent, the interests of 
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John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full 
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and director of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of 
litigation involving Hawley Troxell's clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, while 
also inappropriately representing CropUSA to the detriment of the corporations and Reed 
Taylor. 
47. During the course of the civil action after March 28,2007, Hawley Troxell 
has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady"), the law 
finn that has represented AlA Services and AlA Services before and throughout 
litigation, and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown"), the law firm 
that formerly purportedly represented AIA Service and AIA Insurance in Taylor v. AU 
Services, er af. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, John Taylor 
and others have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving 
themselves, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions have 
occurred with Hawley Troxell's knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of 
AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee. 
48. Hawley Troxell are liable to Reed Taylor for an amount to be proven at 
trial because Hawley Troxell has encouraged, conspired with, provided substantial 
assistance to, and/or aided and abetted John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael 
Cashman, Bryan Freeman, IoLee Duclos, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, 
and/or other interested parties in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties, and other unlawful acts. 
TIle acts offraud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference, conversion, and breaches 
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of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AIA 
Insurance and AIA Services, Hawley Troxell assisted andlor aided and abetted John 
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Reed Taylor's contractual rights 
to control and operate AlA Insurance, which has proximately caused damages to Reed 
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Hawley 
Troxell inappropriately assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested 
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance, and/or CropUSA. which such transactions have been to the detriment of AlA 
Services, AlA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed 
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually 
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell has had full knowledge that its 
client is an interested party and director of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA, 
and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation involving Hawley 
Troxell's former clients, AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and Hawley Troxell has 
assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including, CropUSA) and has 
coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in John Taylor's 
engaging in tortious transactions involving himself, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and 
CropUSA, which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA Services. and AIA 
Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock 
pledgee. 
49. In connection with Hawley Troxell's inappropriate representation and/or 
joint defense of John Taylor, AIA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA, and other 
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman) Hawley 
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Troxell accepted payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in 
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as participating 
andlor assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others. 
50. Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AlA Services, et at., 
Reed Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, Cannon & Bond 
PLLC, advised Hawley Troxell on numerous occasions that its conduct violated Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was inappropriate, and constituted the 
aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including John Taylor 
and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against them. In early 2007, Reed 
Taylor'S counsel advised Hawley Troxell that its inappropriate actions would result in 
claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's counsel reiterated these 
warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite the warnings from Reed 
Taylor's counsel, Hawley Troxell conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed 
Taylor. Hawley Troxell's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as 
intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor. 
51. Hawley Troxell wrongfully assisted John Taylor and other interested 
parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other 
things of value inappropriately obtained from AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance, and 
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA) in preventing 
claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them. Hawley Troxell wrongfully 
assisted andlor failed to prevent interested parties (including John Taylor) in transferring 
the long~term employees of AIA Insurance to CropUSA, while at the same time 
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representing to the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al., that the corporations were 
being operated properly andJor failing to advise the Court of the inappropriate acts and 
transactions. All the while Hawley Troxell was aware of and/or assisted in the 
inappropriate payment of salaries. benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20,000 
per year when AlA Services was insolvent. 
52. Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Hawley Troxell take action to protect 
the assets and funds of AlA Services and AlA Insurance and recover funds and assets 
from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the benefit 
of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell refused to act in accordance with 
the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite Reed Taylor's 
demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered andJor 
protected because of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other interested parnes, 
Hawley Troxell refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts 
to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes. 
53. In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in 
Taylor v. A.lA Services, et aI., Hawley Troxell made arguments that did not benefit AlA 
Services, AIA Insurance, or Reed Taylor, inappropriately made other arguments 
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie 
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parnes, and failed to take 
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, CropUSA, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of 
Michael Cashman, Hawley Troxell successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AIA 
Services, el aI., that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Hawley 
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Troxell should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others. 
54. Despite Reed Taylor's demands that disinterested directors and/or parties 
. must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations, Hawley Troxen refused and 
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation 
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands 
that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance's improper guarantee of a $15,000,000 
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Hawley Troxell refused to act, failed to inform or fully 
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan 
guarantees, and threatened to take legal action against Reed Taylor if he tried to rescind 
or terminate the improper guarantee (since Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the 
balance of the loan increased by over $5,500,000 to over $10,500,000). 
55. Hawley Troxell's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and its duty of care, which require Hawley Troxell to disgorge all attorneys' fees 
and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AIA Services, et aI., and for other related and/or 
unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with the Rilles of 
Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Hawley Troxell refused to do so. 
56. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, the value of AlA Insurance and the 
assets of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations' 
value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds have been transferred to 
CropUSA. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, ownership of CropUSA was vested and 
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major 
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed 
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent 
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minority shareholders and creditors, Hawley Troxell has refused to take action and 
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor. Connie Taylor, 
James Beck and Michael Cashman). 
57, Despite Hawley Troxell having made several legal arguments that lacked 
merit, lacked good faith andlor were not grounded in facts, Hawley Troxell provided a 
settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services, et at,» which included a 
provision that he release all claims against Hawley Troxell as a condition of the 
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rilles of Professional 
Conduct and Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also refused to make any 
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AlA Services as requested by Reed 
Taylor. 
58. Hawley Troxell has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and 
other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, Reed 
Taylor's former' wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares of AIA 
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of 
directors of AIA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor 
and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being 
members of the board of directors of AIA Services, which has further far reaching 
ramifications and results in additional damages against Hawley Troxell. 
59. With full knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed 
Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AIA Services' board until they were paid in 
full, Hawley Troxell proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings 
andlor take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors 
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without Reed Taylor or DOMa Taylor being present and without providing them with 
their right to be present, which further results in all such meetings and decisions being 
null and void, and Hawley Troxell being liable for the associated damages for 
substantially participating in such actions. 
60. Hawley Troxell represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance in litigation 
with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AlA Insurance by and through 
commissions in which Reed Taylor held a security interest of which Hawley Troxell had 
full knowledge. The litigation was resolved, however, and instead of titling the 
$1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as settlement in the name of AlA Insurance, 
Hawley Troxell titled the mortgage only in the name of AIA Services in an inappropriate 
scheme to keep the mortgage from AIA Insurance and Reed Taylor (Reed Taylor is also 
entitled to possession of the Mortgage because it is a distribution from the The Universe, 
which is another subsidiary pledged to Reed Taylor). 
61. Hawley Troxell inappropriately purportedly represented AIA Services, 
AIA Insurance and CropUSA by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge 
of the $1,200,000 Mortgage to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of Hawley Troxell's 
services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. 
Hawley Troxell assisted andlor failed to prevent ancllor notify disinterested parties or the 
Court that AIA Services had inappropriately pledged its sale remaining other significant 
asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for 
Hawley Troxell's services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of 
care, and the law. 
62. Hawley Troxell omitted andlor misrepresented material facts to the Court 
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in Taylor v. AM Services, et 01., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. In several instances, 
Hawley Troxell persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of the 
corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor 
(including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when I-lawley Troxell 
knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded). 
63. Hawley Troxell has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other 
interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided 
and borne by AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John 
Taylor and other interested parties. Upon information and belief. Hawley Troxell has 
assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion letters to auditors of AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance and/or CropUSA to assist John Taylor and other interested parties in 
transferring and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AIA 
Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc while 
providing little or no consideration in return. 
64. Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's 
Agreement, which, upon information and belief, was drafted by Defendant Richard A. 
Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the existence and 
terms of John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement with AlA Services. Even though 
John Taylor has breached the terms of his employment contract with AIA Services by 
competing against AIA Services through CropUSA (and violating the corporate 
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA Insurance, and other inappropriate 
actions, Hawley Troxell has intentionally refused to act in the best interests of AIA 
Services, AIA Insurance, their shareholders, and/or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of Reed 
FIRST AMENDED COMJlLAlNT - 24 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
7'itjfJ 
Taylor. 
65. Hawley Troxell assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining 
funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AIA Services' creditor Reed Taylor 
(including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation 
to AIA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation to John Taylor. and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John 
Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested parties or other appropriate parties as 
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care. 
66. In April 2007, Hawley Troxell permitted anel/or assisted interested parties 
in holding a joint board meeting of AlA Services and AIA Insurance with full knowledge 
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on 
the board of AlA Services and participating in such meetings (Donna Taylor has 
subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting held in April 
2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor 
and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services and AlA Insurance knowing that they 
were interested parties who AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance should be pursuing 
claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA. that they were 
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent 
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of 
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. 
67. Hawley Troxell inappropriately permitted anel/or assisted two interested 
parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to approve anel/or consent to a Joint Retainer and 
Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley Troxell and others. which also facilitated the 
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inappropriate joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting 
irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys 
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care. 
68. . Hawley Troxell has been fully aware of Reed Taylor's rights to property 
in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateraL In fact, 
Defendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services in the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
and other applicable agreements. Hawley Troxell was responsible for issuing opinion 
letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and 
warranties. Hawley Troxell is now asserting arguments counter to the representations 
made in the opinion letter drafted by Hawley Troxell by and through Defendant Richard 
A. Riley. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the commission of torts by John Taylor, 
CropUSA, and other interested parties by representing the corporations in various 
inappropriate transactions. 
69. Hawley Troxell also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of 
AlA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant claims 
against the interested parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA) and the significant 
misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but provided legal services on behalf of the 
interested parties and accepted payment from AIA Services and AlA Insurance. In 
connection with the payment of attorneys I fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor 
v. AIA Services, et al., Hawley Troxell failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed 
Taylor or other disinterested parties to the detriment of AlA Services, AIA Insurance 
andlor Reed Taylor. 
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70. Despite demands to the contrary, Hawley Troxell continued to take 
instructions andlor directives from the unauthorized boards (or John Taylor) of AlA 
Services andlor AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are 
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that 
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty 
of care, andlor the law. 
ll. HAWLEY TROXELL'S AIDING AND ABE'ITING AND CONSPIRACY 
71. Hawley Troxell is committing and has committed tortious acts in concert 
with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, 
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) 
andlor pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parties. 
72. Hawley Troxell knew that the conduct of other parties (including John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA. Bryan 
Freeman, Clements Brown. Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties 
andlor gave substantial assistance andlor encouragement to such other parties in 
breaching said duties. Hawley Troxell knew that it was purportedly using the normally 
lawful act of practicing law to commit andlor substantially assist others in committing 
unlawful acts. 
73. Hawley Troxell gave substantial assistance to other parties (including John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan 
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing andlor 
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acls (including, without limitation, breaches of 
fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious 
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interference, and other claims), and Hawley Troxell's conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AIA Services, AlA Insurance, andlor Reed 
Taylor. 
74. Hawley Troxell conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in 
the commission of the torts and/or caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including 
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, 
Bryan Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the 
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AlA Services, AlA 
Insurance, and Reed Taylor. 
75. Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy 
in the commission of the torts and/or causes of action alleged in this Complaint, 
including, without limitation, the conspiracy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as 
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements. 
76. The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each 
cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting andlor civil conspiracy 
of the torts and/or causes afaction set forth below andlor contemplated in tIns Complaint 
ID. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
77. Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and 
perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance and all proceeds relating to such security interests. Reed Taylor also 
has a security interest in ail of the stock of AlA Insurance and the stock of all of AIA 
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and ail distributions and proceeds 
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage). Hawley 
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Troxell had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing property 
and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption Agreements. 
7&. By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AlA Insurance's 
commissions, his security interest in AlA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual 
right to the possession and control of AlA Insurance on February 22, 2007, all of AIA 
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of 
Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the $1.2 Million Mortgage, settlement 
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or 
utilized in any way by Crop USA, and every dollar of revenue generated by AIA 
Insurance from all sources since February 22,2007. 
79. Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he 
bas a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all 
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the 
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in 
the stock of all of AIA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related 
thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption 
Agreements. 
80. All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced 
through various sources to identifY all funds and ass.ets that Hawley Troxell has 
unlawfully taken or assisted others in taking. Hawley Troxell has taken control of 
property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without 
limitation, all funds received for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs in Taylor v. AM 
Services, et af. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Hawley 
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Troxell bas exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage) andlor funds (any funds received from AlA Services or AIA Insurance) .in 
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor'S 
possessory rights and security interests. 
81. Hawley Troxell has received substantial payments believed to exceed 
$500.000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Hawley Troxell 
had no lawful right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right to 
possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional 
Conduct Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the inappropriate 
titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AIA Services to facilitate the 
payment of funds to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage Reed Taylor was 
legally entitled to possess. Hawley Troxell has also accepted the payment of services for 
attorneys' fees and costs rendered for CropUSA, which were paid by the money andlor 
assets unlawfully derived from AIA Services andlor AlA Insurance, which such money 
andlor assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests. 
82. Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the willful interference with 
property andlor funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AIA Services andlor AlA Insurance; 
and/or which such property andlor funds should be under the possession and/or control of 
AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money 
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Hawley Troxell intentionally deprived Reed 
Taylor. AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds. 
Despite demands, Hawley Troxell has refused to return such property and/or funds, and 
has unlawfully retained the property and/or funds. 
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83. As a direct andlor proximate cause of Hawley Troxell's acts andlor 
omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
84. Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted andlor conspired with other 
parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess andlor 
property to which AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance are entitled to possess (including, 
without limitation, funds paid to Hawley Troxell, funds paid to John Taylor and other 
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5 
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA). As a direct andlor proximate result of 
Hawley Troxell's aiding and abetting andlor civil conspiracy relating to the conversion of 
assets andlor funds that Reed Taylor, AIA Services, andlor AIA Insurance are legally 
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AlA Insurance, and/or AlA Services have been 
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
85. Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell 
has full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell has intentionally 
interfered with Reed Taylor'S contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements 
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell's intentional 
interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's 
contractual rights to vote the shares of AlA Insurance, rights to possession of the 
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, right to be an 
officer and director of AIA Insurance, right to possession and control of AlA Insurance, 
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the 
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Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action are 
tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AIA Services 
andior AlA Insurance. 
86. Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA andlor other parties in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's contractual 
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts andlor omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting 
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's 
contractual rights. 
87. As a direct andlor proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or 
omissions, Reed Taylor bas been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be 
determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
88. AIA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement. 
Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement. Hawley 
Troxell has intentionally interfered with AlA Services' contractual rights set forth in the 
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive Officer's Agreement. 
Hawley Troxell's intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously 
interfering with AIA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring 
AIA Insurance's employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing 
against AlA Services or AIA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John 
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed 
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AIA Services, et al. Also included in this cause 
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of action are tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of 
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. 
89. Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with Jolm 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AIA Services' contractual 
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting 
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AIA Services' 
contractual rights. 
90. As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or 
omissions, AIA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to 
be determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment 
V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
91. Hawley Troxell owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or 
AIA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint. 
92. As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an 
opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and 
through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing 
such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations), which 
further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's 
representations and justifiably relied on such representations. Riley breached his duties 
when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the 
transaction was legal and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his 
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duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payments of 
attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AlA 
Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts 
and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount 
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
93. Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of 
AlA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, a stock 
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance, 
the only authorized officer and director of AlA Insurance, the holder of a security interest 
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, the 
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AlA Services' other subsidiaries 
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000 
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only 
party entitled to the remaining assets of AlA Services and AIA Insurance. 
94. Hawley Troxell owed and owes duties to AlA Services and AIA Insurance 
to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow interested 
parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taleing actions that are not in the 
best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized andior 
conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of assets and 
funds to interested parties to the detriment of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, to 
advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John Taylor and other 
interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors andior other parties to assist 
in the commission of tortious conduct. Hawley Troxell has breached its duties and acted 
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unlawfully (and all improper andlor unlawful acts set forth and/or contemplated in this 
Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud for which AlA Services andlor 
AIA Insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount to be proven at trial or on 
summary judgment. 
95. Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted andlor conspired with John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA and/or other parties in the commission of fraud and/or constructive fraud and 
to otherwise defraud Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. As a direct 
and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts, Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA 
Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on 
summary judgment. 
VI. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS--MALPRACTJCE 
(Reed Taylor;-AiA Services andlor AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
96. Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship 
for all of the reasons set forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the 
allegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From 
time to time, Hawley Troxell has also possessed funds and/or property which it should 
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing 
results in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to Reed Taylor, or at 
the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of 
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AlA Insurance pursuant 
to his contractual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during 
Hawley Troxell's purported representation of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance). 
97. Hawley Troxell's purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries 
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performing similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Hawley Troxell knew that its 
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AlA Services 
andlor AlA Insurance to take action to prevent andlor rectify the breaches of fiduciary 
duties owed by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches 
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Hawley Troxell assisted andlor are assisting in the 
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Hawley Troxell's 
actions and Hawley Troxell's obligations to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance would 
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect 
sums owed by others and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others 
(including, without limitation, 10hn Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael 
Cashman, loLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and CropUSA). 
98. Hawley Troxell breached its duties (including, without limitation, the duty 
of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate result of 
Hawley Troxell's failure to perfonn the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was damaged in 
the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
99. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an 
opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes 
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted lhat the transaction 
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by 
applicable law, Rlley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed 
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues 
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of 
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven 
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at trial or on summary judgment. 
100. Hawley Troxell owed AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance an aliamey-
client relationship for purportedly representing AIA Service andlor AIA Insurance, which 
results. in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to AIA Services 
andlor AIA Insurance. 
101. Hawley Troxell owed AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor Reed Taylor a 
duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical, 
unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with 
the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the corporations (referred to 
herein and above as "duty of care"). Hawley Troxell breached its duty of care as a result 
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corporations and Reed Taylor, to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor. 
102. Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services, AlA 
Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the duties of care and 
loyalty. 
103. Hawley Troxell's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of 
Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and 
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment 
104. Hawley Troxell breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to 
AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley 
Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance in 
connection with the legal services purportedly provided by Hawley Troxell, AIA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary 
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judgment. 
vu. }'Dfl'H CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OF THE I.C.P.A. 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurancets Causes of Actions) 
105. Reed Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are all persons as defIned 
by I.C. § 48-602. Hawley Troxell's purported practice of law constitutes services as 
defIned by I.C. § 48-602. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance have either 
purchased services directly from Hawley Troxell, are known beneficiaries of services 
provided by Hawley Troxell, and/or its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar 
through which AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor has contracted for 
services through trade and commerce. 
106. By way of the attorneys of Hawley Troxell's obligations to the Court and 
as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients, 
beneficiaries of their services. and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the 
Rilles of Professional Conduct and the laws. Hawley Troxell has served only the 
interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, IoLee Duclos, 
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Hawley Troxell has not honestly represented 
to the Court and Hawley Troxell's beneficiary andlor adversary that Hawley Troxell was 
not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the law, to 
the detriment of Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's 
unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers and the integrity of 
the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices and violations ofLC. 
§ 48-601, et seq. 
107. Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that it had approval from the Idaho 
State Bar and approval from authorized constituents to represent AIA Services andlor 
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AlA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C. § 48-
603(5). Hawley Troxell (including, without limitation, Riley's services to Reed Taylor 
through an opinion letter with individual responsibility) has falsely represented that its 
services have been provided to a particular standard when in fact its services have not 
met the appropriate standards (including the standard of care) in violation ofl.C. § 48~ 
603(7). Hawley Troxell has falsely disparaged the services of Reed Taylor's counsel in 
violation of lC. § 48-603(8). Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that services were 
not needed (Le., not making claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, 
Michael Cashman, CropUSA and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in 
violation ofl.C. § 48-603(16). Hawley Troxell has engaged in acts and/or practices that 
have been misleading to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and AIA Imrurance in violation of 
I.C. § 48-603(17). Based upon all of the allegations in this Complaint, Hawley Troxell 
has also violated other applicable provisions oflC. § 48-603 and/or I.C. § 48-601, et seq. 
108. Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money 
and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of Hawley Troxell declared 
unlawful by 1. C. § 48-601, et seq. 
109. AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance has purchased services and have last 
property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of 
Hawley Troxell declared unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, et seq. AlA Services andlor AIA 
Insurance is requesting that aU contracts for purported services provided by Hawley 
Troxell be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contracts be 
returned to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. 
110. Hawley Troxell knew or should have known that its conduct was 
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perpetrated directly and/or indirectly against Reed Taylor in violation of I.C. § 48-608, 
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has lost more than 25% of 
his monthly income by way of Hawley Troxell's unlawful acts. 
111. Hawley Troxell's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, specifically, I.C. § 48-601. et seq. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or 
AIA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees 
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a result of Hawley Troxell's violations and 
as available under LC. § 48-601, et seq. Hawley Troxell's violations or the unlawful acts 
of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the exceptions to I.C. § 
48-601, et seq. as set forth in I.C. § 48-605. 
vm. SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Action) 
112. Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of 
.AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a stock 
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AlA Insurance, 
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest 
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, the 
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services' other subsidiaries 
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000 
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only 
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Based upon all 
of the foregoing and Hawley Troxell's possession of funds and assets of AIA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance from time to time, Hawley Troxell owed a special fiduciary duty to 
safeguard the assets and funds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. 
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113. Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a 
direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's breached fiduciary duties, Reed 
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary 
judgment. 
114. Hawley Troxell. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos 
and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe fiduciary duties to AlA Semces and/or AIA 
Insurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent 
AlA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance (and the 
person who voted the shares). Hawley Troxell has substantially assisted other parties in 
breaching the Bylaws of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. John Taylor owed and/or 
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by way of being Reed Taylor's brother. The 
fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty, 
duty of care and duty to deal in good faith. 
115. Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to 
Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed 
Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the 
obligation to safeguard AlA Services and AIA Insurance's assets and business 
relationships and to recover funds and assets unIawftllly transferred from AIA Services or 
AIA Insurance. 
116. Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos 
and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance; and Hawley Troxell knew that the foregoing parties' conduct 
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AlA 
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Insurance. These breached fiduciary duties are ongoing and Hawley Troxell has 
substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of 
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AIA 
Insurance. Hawley Troxell also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the 
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance. 
117. Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AlA 
Services and/or AlA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary 
judgment by aiding and abetting andlor substantially assisting others (including John 
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission of breaches of 
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA IDsurance. 
118. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an 
opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes 
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction 
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by 
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed 
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues 
because of AlA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of 
Riley's acts andlor omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven 
at trial or on summary judgment. 
IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATIONIWASTE 
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions) 
119. Hawley Troxell has known that AlA Services is insolvent and AlA 
Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateraL Hawley Troxell has lmown that AIA 
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, 
Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent AIA Services. Hawley Troxell 
has known that AIA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its 
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years. 
120. Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and 
fees for purportedly being officers and/or directors of AIA Services and AlA Insurance. 
Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to waste the remaining assets of AIA Services 
and/or AIA Insurance. All the while Hawley Troxell has lmown of Reed Taylor's rights 
and AIA Services' insolvency. Hawley Troxell had full knowledge that John Taylor and 
other directors and officers compensation was required to be set by the lawful board of 
directors of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance, but substantially assisted John Taylor 
and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation. 
121. Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA 
Services and/or AlA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary 
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including, without 
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the 
payment of excessive compensation. 
X. DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
1. Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than tweive (12) on all 
claims and damages so triable. 
XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief: 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 43 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
1. For a judgmeot against Hawley Troxell. jointly and severally, for 
$10,500,000 in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble 
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary 
judgme~t, plus an award ofpre~judgment and post..judgment interest; 
2. For a judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally. for treble 
damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48~ 
608(2); 
3. For a judgment requmng the disgorgement of the payments of all 
attorneys' fees and costs paid to Hawley Troxell by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance; 
4. For judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for additional 
damages as provided under I.C. § 48~608; 
5. For such other relief as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C. § 
48-601, e/ seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary 
injunction to restrain Hawley Troxell from undertaking further representation; 
6. For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 
Idaho Law. including, without limitation, I.C. § 48-608, I.C. § 12-120 and/or T.C. § 12-
121; and 
7. F or such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this __ day of October, 2008. 
Dntn\IJI5\1322\Amcndcd ComplninLI-ITEH.FlNAL.doc 
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INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 55. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
I, ReedJ. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this First 
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint, and believe 
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief. 
Reed J. Taylor 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of October, 2008. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: __________ _ 
My commission expires: _____ _ 
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7'1y/ 
MICHAEL S BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLL.C 
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, VVA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455··7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
DIANE ASH 
_".' I 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, an individual, who is 
bringing this action on behalf of himself and Case No.: CV.-08-01765 
on behalfofthe creditors andlor shareholders 
of AlA Services CorpOIation and AlA NOTICE OF APPEAL 
fnsurance, Tnc ; 
Appellant, 
v 
GARY D BABBITT, an individual; D JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HA vv'LEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES f-X, 
unknown individuals; 
. ___ . __ ~. ___ ._._. _____ . Respondents. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY 0 BABBITT, D TOHN 
ASHBY, PATRICK V COLLINS, RICHARD A RILEY, AND 
. . HAWlEY. XRDXELLENNlS..& HAWLEY LLE .. AND. IHRPARllES'. __ . _ 
A T TORNEY JAMES D LAROE, ELAM & BURKE., P A, PO BOX 
1539, BOISE, ID 83704; AND 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
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NonCE rs HEREBY GIVEN lHA 1: 
The above named Appellant Reed J T aylO! appeals against the above· 
named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 
entered in the above entitled action on the 23rd day of December, 2008, the Honorable 
TeffM Brudie presiding 
2. Appellant has a light to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgments/Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders undet and 
pursuant to Rules 4 and 1 1 (a)(l ), r AR. 
3. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends 
to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression); 
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect 
otheIs: 
a Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud, 
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, 
andlor tortious interference andlor causes of actions pertaining to 
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the 
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action 
b Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar 
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of 
fiduciruy duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious 
interference andlo! causes of action pertaining to aiding and 
abetting andlor conspiracy to assist others in the commission of 
any of the foregoing causes of action? 
c -Does a plaintiff state a -canse--of actiorr-aga:in:st-arnrttomey fur· .. 
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney 
accepted pa.yment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the 
attomey knew or should have known were funds in which the 
plaintifiheld a valid and perfected security interest? 
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d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the 
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation. have standing to 
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by 
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation? 
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured 
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert 
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the 
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation? 
f. Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hislheI scope of 
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege? 
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests 
when the representation was approved by persons with 
director/officer conflicts of interest? 
h .. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person fmm asserting 
claims against an attorney, when the p1aintiff does not have pIivity 
of contract with the attorney, fOI violations of Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Act? 
i In considering a motion to dismiss under LR.C.P 12(b)(6), is it 
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an 
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which 
are not in the record for that case? 
j Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged 
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
k Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of 
an insolvent corporation, assert direct andlor derivative claims for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
Can the district comt judge, who is the same judge for two related 
'aG-tien&;--oomYider-pr-i¥ileged--OOetlnlen~:in-·wmrting·a moti-on to' ... ----- ., -
dismiss under IRep 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the 
documents to the other pmty? 
m If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the 
expert provides testimony thmugh an affidavit relying on the 
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorney-
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client privilege been waived and must the documents be produced 
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel? 
n, IfIdaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense fot' an attomey, can 
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to IRC P 
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney 
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of 
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from 
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have 
known that: (1) the representatives of the corpOIation have 
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation 
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the cotporation has not held an 
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of at teast two 
cOlporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attomey's 
three different clients. 
o. Does an attorney owe a non~client any fiduciary duties, special 
duties, and/or third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney 
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1) 
that all of the shar'es and revenues of the corpolation client the 
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the 
non-client and another client is in default ofthe obligations which 
trigger remedies pertaining to such secUIity interests; (2) the non-
client has voted the shar'es appointing himself as the sale officer 
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is 
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties 
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds ale 
insufficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds 
may have been wrongfully transfened fi:'om the corporation client 
by the very individuals directing the litigation (5) the parent 
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by 
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by 
the par'ent corporation client who is highly insolvent? 
p Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the 
United States Constitution or the State of fdaho's Constitution) to 
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes 
OI action. to..protect, andJ.oI-.reco~ . .asset&.:whicb..,.a.m_suhjec.t.1£La~ .. "<, 
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys 
relating to anyone or more the foregoing? 
4. There has not been an Order sealing all or any pottion of this record 
5 A repOIter's transcript is not requested. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
6.. Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's 
record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, IA R : 
a This Notice of Appeal; 
b Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; 
c. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; 
d- Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
e Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplement Complainr (including 
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint); 
f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend Complaint; and 
g Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. 
T. I certify that: 
a A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served oil a reporter 
because a transcript has not been requested. 
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for 
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested 
c The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid 
d The appellate filing fee has been paid 
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be selved 
pursuant to Rule 20 
DA TED this 30th day ofJanuary, 2009. 
i. /0 
BY:~L~!::::~~. 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attomeys for Appellate Reed Taylor 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIL"E 
I HEREBY CERIlFY that on the 30th day ofJanuary, 2009, I call1ied to be served 
a true and conect copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the following: 
______ HANTI DELIVERY 
_---.2L_ U.S .. MAIL 
___ . ___ OVERNIGID MAlL 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
~.= EMAIL ( pdf attachment) 
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James D. LaRue 
Elam & Burke, PA 
P.O .. Box 1539 
Boise, Tn 83704 
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71{'7 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;CROP USA) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER 
IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDA VIT 
OF PAUL E. PEDERSON FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON 
02/26/09 & 03/03/09 -1-
Case No: CV 07-00208 
DEFENDANT 
R. JOHN TAYLOR'S 
JOINDER IN INTERVENOR'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT 
WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF 
PAUL E. PEDERSON FILED 
BY PLAINTIFF ON 02/26/09 
& 03/03/09 
71&1 
DefendantR. John Taylorjoins in INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON 
FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON 02/26/09 & 03/03/09. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the lOth day of March, 2009, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
rod@scblegal.com 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PllC 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 
Spokane, ViA 99201 
Facsimile: (509) 455-7111 
mbissel1@cbklawyers.com 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, ViA 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
david@gittinslaw.com 
DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER 
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877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
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Charles E. Harper 
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IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
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David A. Gittins 
Law Offices of David A. Gittins 
843 Seventh Street 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Telephone: (509) 758-2501 
ISB #6514 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 











individually and the community property ) 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, ) 
a single person; and, JOLEE DUCLOS, ) 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE ) 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho corporation; and ) 
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, ) 
individually and the community property ) 
comprised thereof, ) 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRYAN FREEMAN AND 
JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER TO 
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON 







Case No. CV-07-00208 
DEFENDANTS BRYAN FREEMAN 
AND JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER 
IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT 
WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. 
PEDERSON FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON 
FEBRUARY 26, 2009 AND 
MARCH 3, 2009 
717/ 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho) 
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., ) 



















401(K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR ) 
THE AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Intervenor. ) 
COME NOW Defendants, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos, by and through their attorney, 
David A. Gittins, and join in the Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness 
Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed by Plaintiff on February 26,2009 and March 3, 2009, and all 
subsequent amendments, supplements, and filings relating to said Reply made by Intevenor 401(k) 
Profit Sharing Plan for AlA Services Corporation. 
DEFENDANT'S BRYAN FREEMAN AND 
JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER TO 
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON 




DATED this /tl"- day of March, 2009. 
LA W OFFICES OF DAVID A. GITTINS 
ByQ4_~ 
DAVID A. GITTIN6, ISB 6514 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Notice of Service by Electronic Mail 
Nancy A. Goodman, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am a person over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not an interested party to the above-
entitled action. 
On March 10,2009, I emailed the within document to the persons named below at the email 
addresses set forth under each name. 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Email: rod@scblegal.com 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
Attorney for R. John Taylor 
Email: mmcnichols@clbrmc.com 
James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
Quarles & Brady, LLP 
Attorney for Crop USA Insurance 
Email: JJG@quarles.com 
charper@quarles.com 
DEFENDANT'S BRYAN FREEMAN AND 
JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER TO 
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON 
FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON 2/26/09 AND 
3/03/09 3 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Email: mbissell@cbklawyers.com 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendants C. Taylor & Becks 
Email: david@rbcox.com 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 




Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for JoLee Duclos, Trustee 
Email: CharlesABrown@cableone.net 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Notice of Service is true and correct. 
Signed at Clarkston, Washington this IO~ day of March, 2009. 
Nancy A. Goodman 
DEFENDANT'S BRYAN FREEMAN AND 
JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER TO 
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON 































DAVID R. RISLEY, ISB No. 1789 
RANDALL, BLAKE & COX, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1234 
(208) 743-1266 (Fax) 
Attorneys for Connie Taylor, James Beck and 
Corrine Beck 
FILED 
tOO! MBft.ll PM '1 1 ~ 
PATT O. WEEK~a, 
CLERK F HE OIST. W 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOJ\TD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE , 







AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
Corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE ) 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA ) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 









CASE NO. CV07-00208 
JOINDER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, 
JAMES BECK AND CORRINE BECK 
RE: 
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PETERSON 
FILED BY PLAINTIFF 
ON 02126/09 AND 03/0109 
JOINDER RE INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE-Page 1 Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 




































COMES NOW, Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck, and 
Counterclairnants Connie W. Taylor and James Beck, join in the Intervenor's Motion to Strike 
Portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed by Plaintiff on 02126109 and 
03103109 filed by Charles A. Brown, counsel for the Intervenor, on or about March 5, 2009. 
DATED this 11 th day of March, 2009. 
RANDALL, BLAKE & COX, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, 
J ames Beck and Corrine Beck, and 
Counterclaimants Connie W. Taylor and 
James Beck 
JOINDER RE INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE-Page 2 Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 





























CERTJFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March 11, 2009, at my direction, the foregoing Joinder of Connie 
Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck re Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert 
Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed by Plaintiff on 02126109 and 03103109 was served 
on the following in the manner shown: 
Counsel for Plaintiff: (copy) 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon and Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Plaintiff: (copy) 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, WA 99201-3816 
Counsel for AIA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA: (copy) 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Elmis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Counsel for Crop USA Insurance: (copy) 
James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
Quarles & Brady, LLP 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, IL 60661-2511 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 746-8421 
[ Y Overnight MaillFederal Express 






US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (509) 455-7111 
Overnight Mail/Federal Express 
Email (mbissell@cbklawyers.com) 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 342-3829 
[ J/ Overnight MaillFederal Express 





U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (312) 715-5155 
Overnight MaillFederal Express 
Email (charper(a).guarles.com&jjg@guarles.com) 
JOINDER RE INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE-Page 3 Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LA W 
Post Office Box 446 





























CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (Continued) 
Counsel for R. Jolm Taylor: (copy) 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Duclos and Freeman: (copy) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
843 Seventh Street 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
] US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
] Hand Delivery 
] Facsimile (208) 746-0753 
[ ] Overnight MaillFederal Express 
[~ Email (lmncnichols@clbrmc.com) 
[ ] US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (509) 758-3576 
[ ] / Over:ught MaillFederal Express 
['0' EmaIl (david@gittinslaw.com) 
Counsel for AIA Services 401 (K) Plan: (copy) 
Charles A. Brown [ ] US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Attorney at Law [ ] Hand Delivery 
P. O. Box 1225 [ ] Facsimile (208) 746-5886 
Lewiston, ID 83501 [ ]/ Overnight MaillFederal Express 
["0 Email (CharlesABrown@cableone.net) 
JOINDER RE INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE-Page 4 Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 7171 
